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MILITARY AFFAIRS AND PUBLIC SECURITY

MILITARY SCIENTIFIC-TECHNICAL RESEARCH DISCUSSED

Hanoi TAP CHI QUAN DOI NHAN DAN in Vietnamese No 10, Oct 76 pp 14-32

[Article by Senior Colonel Hoang Dinh Phu: "Military Scientific and Technical Research in the New Revolutionary Phase"]

[Text]

I

Military Scientific and Technical Research in the Recent Anti-U.S. War for National Salvation

After 30 Years of arduous and extremely heroic warfare, our people won a great victory and completely defeated the U.S. imperialists, the most powerful imperialist nation of our era. That was a victory for our Party's correct, independent, autonomous, and extremely creative political line and military line, and a victory for the peerless combined strength of Vietnamese people's war and the sympathy, support, and effective assistance of the fraternal socialist nations and the progressive forces all over the world.

The war between our country and the U.S. imperialists which took place in the two parts of our country was a modern war. The U.S. imperialists utilized on the Vietnamese battlefield a very great number of material and technical facilities, with all types of the most modern weapons and equipment, with the exception of nuclear weapons. Furthermore, in the process of committing aggression in our country they set up many research organs with special authority to rapidly resolve the military science and technology problems posed by their war of aggression in Vietnam and sought all ways to develop to the highest possible degree their latent capabilities with regard to military science, technology, and industry in order to win the war. For our part, in the process of promoting the scientific-technical revolution in general to create the material-technical bases of socialism under wartime circumstances, our Party, on the basis of our country's industry, although still very limited, and the great assistance of the fraternal socialist countries, paid much attention to increasing the modern equipment and weapons of the armed forces

and to positively creating a corps of technical cadres with an increasingly higher level and promoting military science and research to serve combat and the war.

Our military science and technology research during the anti-U.S. resistance war for national salvation was intended to assure the greatest possible development of the effectiveness of modern weapons, in a manner appropriate to the requirements of the military art of people's war in our country; the good maintenance and repair, and the long use, of that weaponry and equipment under our country's topographical and climatic conditions; the ability to effectively cope with the modern technical equipment of the enemy; and the improvement, designing, and manufacturing of weapons and equipment serving our operational formula and strategic communications and transportation, in accord with our industrial capability.

The research mottoes were theory related to reality, technology closely combined with tactics, remaining close to the battlefield, remaining close to roads and bridges, and using the results of annihilating the enemy on the battlefield to evaluate the results of research. We went all-out to employ modern scientific and technical theory and created technical equipment that was easy to make, easy to use, and suitable for our method of fighting and to the capabilities of our country's industry and our army's utilization level.

Those work missions and mottoes were truly a compass for the activities of our army's scientific-technical research during the recent period. That work was developed quite broadly, from the research organs of the Ministry to the armed forces branches, combat arms, specialized departments, schools, and principal depots and enterprises, attained important results, and contributed worthily to the combat accomplishments of our armed forces.

The task of researching development and utilization, combined with the rich experiences of the actualities of combat, contributed to increasing the effectiveness of the modern weapons and equipment, to developing the tactical and technical capabilities of our equipment, in accordance with the characteristics of the battlefield and the actual combat circumstances, and to overcoming the enemy's plots and schemes. We also researched and manufactured many types of maintenance materials and created corresponding maintenance regulations in order to partially overcome the phenomena of metal corrosion, mildew, and moisture penetration, which occur every day and quickly ruin weapons and equipment in the tropical climate environment. The research work also participated in partially overcoming the very great difficulties regarding replacement parts with which to carry out repairs and effectively carried out the restoration of old parts and the manufacture of new parts.

In the mission of researching in order to cope with the enemy's modern equipment and technical facilities, we also attained many good results. In the course of the war the U.S. imperialists often improved their technical equipment, such as magnetic bombs, torpedoes, radar jamming devices, etc., on the basis of the newest accomplishments of electronic technology and automation

technology. Our scientific-technical research, closely combined with the tactical and combat actualities, closely followed the improvements made by the enemy, discovered the principles, capabilities, strengths, and weaknesses of their technical equipment and tactical schemes, and on that basis recommended effective counter-measures and contributed worthily to the great victory of our soldiers and people.

In the mission of researching, designing, and manufacturing weapons and equipment to serve the requirements of combat, we were limited with regard to our designing and technological levels, and with regard to the very limited capabilities of our country's industry in wartime. Our scientific-technical cadres and national defense workers closely adhered to the characteristics of the battlefield and our unique operational formula, researched the improvement, planning, and manufacture of relatively simple but effective combat facilities to annihilate the enemy's war facilities deep within their rear areas, sink a large number of the enemy's warships on the rivers, attack tanks, attack the enemy in fortifications, and guide and assist the battle-fields in creating the repair bases and producing on the spot the various types of mines and grenades, and widely serve people's war in the localities.

The results of our military science and technology during the recent period were not large in number, and there were no projects that were truly large in comparison to the level of modern science and technology. In the process of carrying out that extremely new and difficult task, we could not avoid some groping around. But after the war ended we were very enthusiastic when we saw that in the recent test of strength between ourselves and the enemy, which was unequal with regard to scientific-technical potential, the scientific-technical work in our country and in our army contributed effectively to the combined strength of people's war under modern conditions and contributed to the all-round defeat of the U.S. imperialists on all fronts, including the military science and technology front.

On the basis of the actualities of military science and technology during the recent anti-U.S. resistance war for national salvation, we may reach several preliminary conclusions:

1. Military science and technology is an objective requirement of the development and combat missions of a modern army. It is also an important manifestation of the spirit of independence and autonomy and the positive offensive spirit in the sphere of military science and technology.

The special characteristics of the battlefield, the rapid development of the enemy's weapons and equipment, and the continual changes in their tactical and technical schemes, required the increasing of the levels of development, use, and management and the maximum development of the capabilities of our tactics and techniques in combat, and required the assuring of the technical aspects of the development of our tactics. Those objective factors continually posed problems which had to be resolved in scientific-technical research and the recapitulation of actual experiences, if we were to find appropriate methods of resolving them. Those solutions usually could not be found in

books. Specialists from friendly countries positively helped us resolve some of them, but of course could not do our work for us. We ourselves had to do research to find ways to resolve our problems. Our latent scientific-technical potential was very small, but profoundly aware of the objective requirements of researching modern scientific-technical problems, we boldly begun work with a spirit of independence and autonomy and a positive offensive attitude, gradually overcame difficulties we thought could not be overcome, and gradually enabled our military science and technology to have increasingly clearer effectiveness. Military scientific-technical research gradually became an objective requirement of the development and combat of our people's armed forces. Our cadres and men made many all-out efforts and achieved accomplishments that were worthy of pride.

2. Fully understanding the Party's military viewpoints regarding science and technology, and firmly grasping the research missions and mottoes determined by the Central Military Party Committee were basic elements determining the victory of the research work.

In war, the requirements regarding science and technology are very great and very diverse. There are requirements the fulfillment of which requires that we invest much money and many people over a long period of time. There are requirements which may have no notable significance, and which do not even need to be considered, in regard to one battlefield, but which are extremely important and extremely urgent with regard to another battlefield, in another space and time. What do do, what not do do, and what should be done to attain certain requirements rapidly and most economically are very important, very decisive questions enabling scientific-technical research to serve the operational requirements of the battlefield. Only if we firmly grasped the research missions and mottoes determined by the Central Military Party Committee could we discover with increasing clarity and increasingly more systematically the problems that had to be resolved, in accordance with the missions and capabilities, in the process of change of the war and of the actualities of military scientific-technical research. When we consider the specific research tasks during the recent period, we see that we did not select every topic correctly, and not every subject was carried out smoothly and attained good results. But in general, scientific-technical research attained good accomplishments and contributed to the common victory, although our scientific-technical potential was still very tiny. The reason for that was that we had extremely correct and creative military science and technology research missions and guidelines which were based on the Party's political lines and missions and military lines and missions, and on the actualities of the battlefield, the scientific and technical realities, and the industrial capabilities of our country and army. The military science and technology organs essentially did a good job of carrying out the research directions, missions, and mottoes set forth by the Central Military Party Committee and, on that basis, selected the research topics, improved the research formulas and methods, and sought all ways to rapidly employ the results of research in actual circumstances.

3. Scientific and technical research is a very important measure for comprehensively training cadres and developing scientific and technical potential.

By means of the scientific-technical research during the war, our army's scientific-technical cadres clearly matured and our country's scientific-technical potential was also further strengthened. During the recent period research was carried out not only in the laboratories and on the design tables, but also in the factories, on training fields, and on battlefields. Our research cadres, achieving as well as possible the motto of "using the results of annihilating the enemy on the battlefield to evaluate the results of research," after completing the phase of researching and designing, went into the factories to observe and guide production, directly trained the troops in utilization, and worked with the troops in actual application in combat. The system of those activities was truly a process of continually perfecting the research task so that it could be more appropriate to the actualities of production, the tactical requirements, and the actualities of combat. At the same time, it was also a process of forging scientific-technical cadres in a comprehensive and lively manner, strengthening and developing their scientific knowledge, improving their organizational ability, strengthening their will to fight, and forging work styles. During the recent period the research task also created conditions for the scientific-technical cadres to come into direct contact with the enemy's modern technical equipment, and thereby increase their knowledge of such technical equipment and grasp its strengths, weaknesses, and developmental tendencies. That was extremely valuable knowledge which could only be obtained in the process of carrying out the research task in war and which was essential for the future missions of the research task. In the course of the recent research, we were able to create and develop, to a degree, the material-technical bases of the research task and accumulate considerable experience in guiding and organizing the implementation of military scientific and technical research. That is a very good basis on which we can advance to fulfilling the military scientific and technical research mission in the present phase.

II

The Military Science and Technology Research Mission in the New Phase

Our country's revolution has entered a new phase, the phase of building socialism throughout the nation. The present, very great political missions of our armed forces are being prepared to fight to defend the Fatherland and socialism and economic construction to develop the nation. Military scientific and technical research in the new phase must be intended to meet the needs of building a modern, regular people's army and be prepared to defend the Fatherland, combined with service to the economic construction mission.

In the recent anti-U.S. resistance war for national salvation, our country's industrial base was very small and was heavily damaged in the war. But due to our Party's correct, independent, and autonomous international line we were able to obtain the effective aid of the fraternal socialist countries to strengthen our armed forces and form a network of modern or relatively

modern combat equipment of the armed forces branches and combat arms and a network of depots, stations, and repair shops at the various echelons. The effective management, development, and use of those material-technical bases contributed importantly to the great victory of the anti-U.S. resistance war for national salvation. After the South was completely liberated we captured a rather large quantity of U.S.-puppet technical equipment. Thus in our armed forces at the present time there are two categories of weapons and technical equipment: those of the socialist countries and those of the U.S. That is a very great material-technical base, a very important source of material strength for us. Therefore, promoting scientific-technical research to contribute to increasing the combat effectiveness of the existing weapons and technical equipment, repairing them promptly and with high quality, assuring their durability under our country's climatic conditions, and managing their use rationally and on a scientific basis is an extremely important mission of military scientific and technical research during the coming period.

In comparison to the armies of the countries with advanced science, technology, and industry, the weapons and technical equipment now possessed by our army are only at a certain level of modernity and do not yet form a complete system. The category of weapons and equipment provided to us by the socialist countries gradually took form, according to the developmental phases of the war, in order to resolve the extremely urgent specific requirements of the anti-U.S. resistance war for national salvation in both parts of our nation. The category of the U.S.-puppet weapons captured in the South reflects the policy of neocolonial war in the sphere of technical military equipment. Its existence and operation depended entirely on the U.S. imperialists. That quantity of weapons and technical equipment has increased the combat strength of our army and has contributed to raising its level of modernity, but it also posed for us new difficulties and many new problems which must be resolved in management, utilization, and especially in technical maintenance.

Furthermore, the existing weapons and technical equipment, including that of our camp and that we have recently captured from the enemy, after a certain period of time will become worn out and damaged, or their quality will decline. They will not only undergo visible attrition but also invisible attrition because the tactical and technical capabilities of the weapons and technical equipment will become increasingly backward in comparison to the rapid development of military technology in the world at present. Worthy of note is the fact that the U.S. imperialists, after their heavy defeat in Vietnam, recapitulated and reevaluated the effect of their weapons on the battlefields, and are feverishly promoting scientific research, design, and experimentation to improve their weapons and equipment, especially in the sphere of strategic weapons, air force, navy, missiles, and electronic warfare and command communications facilities. With its "new Pacific policy" the U.S. is encouraging its allies in that area to create defense industries and develop military technology. They also threaten the use of nuclear weapons in hopes of intimidating the revolutionary struggle movements of the people of the various nations.

That situation and the national defense mission of our country in the new phase of the revolution demand that we continue to develop our army along the lines of professionalism and modernity, promote military scientific and technical research, and develop our national defense industry, in order to take the initiative in coping with all circumstances. We must endeavor to, within a certain period of time, closely combine the forces both within and without the army and combine self-reliance with obtaining international assistance, and can advance to researching, designing, and manufacturing the necessary modern weapons and technical equipment for our armed forces, effectively serve the mission of defending the Fatherland in peacetime and people's wars to defend the Fatherland under modern conditions, if they should occur, and contribute effectively to defeating all wars of aggression, so matter how modern the technical weapons used by the enemy. That is a very basic mission, one of great strategic significance, of our scientific and technical research at present.

Thus scientific and technical research in our army has the mission of researching in order to cope with the ever-developing modern technical equipment of the enemy. Any enemy daring to commit aggression against and take over our country in the future must be an enemy with more modern technical equipment than we have. In the sphere of material-technical strength, we may change the comparison of forces by increasing our weapons and technical equipment, and may also do so by developing the combat effectiveness of our existing technical equipment and limiting the effect of the enemy's technical equipment. Research to counter the enemy's modern technical equipment is aimed principally at the goal of limiting its effect, protecting and developing the effect of our technical equipment, contributing to changing the comparison of forces, and winning victory on the battlefield. That research mission must be carried out urgently even in peacetime, and will have to be done with extreme urgency during wartime.

Those directions and missions are principally intended to meet the requirements of combat readiness and developing our army so that it may continue to advance to a professional, modern status. But many contents in those directions and missions, such as research regarding tropicalization, applied mathematics, manufacturing design, materials, technology, etc., are also very appropriate to the requirement of economic development. Therefore, we must pay all-out attention to combining the application of those research results in order to serve our army's economic development mission in particular and contribute to the economic development of our entire country in general.

We are fulfilling the military scientific-technical research mission under circumstances with new, very basic advantages. We have the correct and creative political line and military line of the Party. Our Party's military line has been tested in war and is continuing to undergo development and perfecting in the present period of peacefully building and defending the country. We have the great potential of the entire nation to meet the strategic goal of, within 15-20 years, essentially fulfilling the mission of building the material-technical bases of socialism in our country, and building a powerful, socialist Vietnam with modern industry, modern agriculture, strong

national defense, and advanced culture and science. The good development of science, technology and industry of the entire nation will be a solid base on which to develop military science and technology and national defense industry. With regard to the new mission, we are also encountering considerable obstacles regarding the scientific-technical level of the cadres and workers, the modern scientific-technical bases serving research and production, and our ability to organize and manage science and technology in order to rally the large forces within and without the army, in order to obtain as much foreign aid as possible which appropriate to the requirements of the research task. We must clearly realize the new, very great requirements of the present military science and technology research mission, and must also profoundly analyze both the advantages and difficulties in that mission in order to have correct policies and measures and fulfill the immediate research mission as well as possible, while positively preparing to advance, within the not-too-distant future, to achieving by all means the great missions of military scientific and technical research.

III

Some Immediate Major Tasks

1. Creating long-range directions and plans for military scientific-technical research.

Scientific-technical research is a very complicated sphere of activity. A comprehensive concept of research usually includes many phases with different missions, natures, and positions:

1. Basic research, with the mission of seeking the operational laws of things and the relationships among things.
2. Applied research, with the mission of determining capabilities to apply principles and theories to resolve actual problems.
3. Design research, with the mission of designing and building specific technical models to meet the requirements of production or combat.
4. Testing and evaluation, with the mission of testing the new technical models in the factory after they have built and in the process of test-using them in units under different tactical, climatic, and topographical conditions, and on that basis recommending that they be mass-produced and supplied to the troops.

The initial two phases -- basic research and applied research -- are usually combined in the sphere of research called scientific research. The next two phases -- design research and testing-evaluation -- are in the sphere of research called developmental research or perfecting research. With regard to the new research topics, in the applied research and design research phases there is usually a preparatory step called exploratory research, which is

intended to determine the maximum capabilities of the different projects. Only then are official research topics determined, with specific tactical, technical, and economic norms.

Under our specific circumstances, military scientific and technical research is principally applied research and technical development research, on the basis of an increasingly higher level of basic scientific knowledge. Those spheres of research are concerned with modern military science and technology, and require an extremely complicated, very meticulous, and very costly research process. According to the experiences of foreign nations, expenditures for the research topics must be calculated in the millions of dollars or millions of rubles, at times tens of millions. The period between the beginning of research and its conclusion, when there are models of new, combat-ready equipment, is 5 to 10 years, or 10 to 15 years, according to the degree of modernity and complexity of the topic. The manufacture of modern technical equipment models requires the combining of the technical capabilities of dozens and hundreds of large factories. For that reason, as we begin the new mission of military scientific and technical research, design research, and the manufacture of modern technical equipment, a matter of foremost importance is correctly determining the specific goals, guidelines, and directions of long-range research plans. Those are elements which determine all aspects of the research task, from contents to research organization, strengthening the corps of cadres and workers, and creating the material-technical bases of research.

Our united Vietnam is not a small nation. We are endeavoring to essentially complete the creation of the material-technical bases of socialism within the next 15-20 years. The results of that process will allow us to gradually manufacture in our country the necessary weapons and technical equipment to equip the armed forces in accordance with our Party's line of independence and autonomy. Therefore, in the development of our country's industry we must create a relatively complete national defense industry. But we can carry out modern technical development research only on a selected basis. Our nation does not have sufficient manpower and wealth to carry out military technical development research comprehensively, as a small number of industrial and military super-powers have done. The problem lies in determining what to select and the formula for carrying out the research to have the greatest effect in combat without requiring the investment of too much money and manpower, beyond the actual capabilities of the country. Furthermore, we must seek ways to closely combine the requirements of military-technical development and the requirement of economic development, which both benefits the economy and national defense.

In order to do a good job of resolving that basic problem, in the long-range military scientific and technical research directions and plans we must profoundly research a large number of matters of a strategic nature, such as the military science and technology requirements of future wars to defend the Fatherland; forecasts of the development of military science and technology in the world; the direction and development capability of science, technology, and industry in our country; and our actual capabilities at present

with regard to military science and technology potential. The creation of the long-range research directions and plans is itself a very complicated scientific project which requires the close coordination of the scientific-technical organs within and without the army and between military science and technology and the economy, and requires a period of time. At first we can only affirm the major goals, the principal directions and stages of long-range planning. Only then can we enter into drafting plans with specific norms and measures, and only then can we draft plans in each period of time in order to grasp the plan drafting element with relative certainty.

2. Develop the scientific-technical potential for research.

In order to comprehensively fulfill the mission of military technical research and development, the major powers of the world, such as the Soviet Union and the U.S., have had to create enormous scientific-technical potential with 600,000 or 700,000 scientific-technical cadres, an extensive network of research and planning institutes, and experimental centers, with yearly expenditures of tens of billions of rubles or dollars. The other countries with the limited mission of selective scientific and technical development research must also create for themselves a small scientific-technical capability with several tens of thousands of cadres and annual expenditures of several hundred millions. Military scientific and technical capability cannot be separated from the over-all scientific-technical capability of the entire nation, and the developmental capability and level of the entire national economy.

In comparison to our military science and technology research during the new phase, the scientific-technical potential in our army and in our country is still too small. We must think in order to seek ways to fully utilize the new, very great present capabilities of our country's revolution and effectively carry on the accomplishments of the scientific-technical revolution in the world, in order to do a good job of the research mission without requiring an investment of money and manpower that exceeds our country's capability. However, from such a low starting point as that of the present, if we do not rapidly develop the scientific-technical potential to a certain level, it will be difficult to carry out the developmental research topics along modern lines.

Everyone knows that several basic elements of the scientific-technical potential of a country are people (consisting of the corps of scientific-technical cadres and even the broad mass forces with certain cultural and technical levels) and the material-technical bases (consisting of the material-technical bases of the national economy and of scientific-technical research.) With the strong development of the scientific-technical revolution in the world, the scientific-technical potential also includes the scientific information capabilities, international cooperation, and the level of organization and management of the research task. Those factors constitute the scientific-technical potential in our area. Therefore, we must do a good job of resolving the following problems:

1. Building and strengthening the corps of research cadres.

In the recent anti-U.S. resistance war for national salvation, we gradually formed a corps of scientific-technical cadres with a certain quantity and with good levels, and which had been tested and forged in actual scientific and technical work in wartime. That is very valuable capital for fulfilling the scientific and technical research mission in the new phase. However, in comparison to the new nature and large scale of the present research mission, our corps of cadres has also revealed many rather serious deficiencies: it is not yet balanced and complete with regard to the new research directions; it has a certain ability and experience in exploiting and using our technical equipment and in coping with the technical equipment of the enemy, but it is still weak with regard to basic theory and the level of design and technology; and there is a lack of sector-leading cadres. We must rapidly overcome those deficiencies by means of the most positive, effective measures. Especially in scientific-technical research along modern lines it is necessary to have collective groups with combined strength, and people with talent. We must select young, talented cadres for supplementing at the post-graduate level, while paying all-out attention to creating conditions for the scientific cadres, especially the managerial cadres in the various research areas and elements, and sector-leading cadres, to have many opportunities to come into contact with the new scientific-technical accomplishments and with the scientists of the various countries in order to assimilate the knowledge and precious experiences which the curricula of the institutes cannot teach. The most urgent matter at present is to train a corps of sector-leading and general project manager cadres in order to be able to manage the research of major topics and design complicated projects. In the world there are no schools to train sector-leading and general project manager cadres. It is necessary to, in the course of actual experimental scientific and design research activities, discover talented cadres and boldly put them in charge of the research topics and the design projects, from a low level to a high level. Among them, we must select the people with the best prospects and further rectify their remaining weaknesses so that they may become truly capable of sector-leading and general project manager cadres.

In addition to the research cadres, we must pay all-out attention to the corps of technical personnel and skilled workers. That corps must also be developed uniformly, trained in fundamentals, and play a very important role in research. It is also necessary to improve the cultural level and scientific-technical knowledge of the broad popular masses. It is necessary to have correct policies to stimulate and encourage research, innovation, and inventions.

2. Developing the material-technical bases of research along the lines of modernization.

The material-technical bases are a very important element in the latent potential of the research task. In the past, when the research contents were still simple and the requirements of research were not all-inclusive, the requirements regarding the material-technical bases were not very demanding.

Manual calculations, simple experimental measurements, and a combination of testing on the drill grounds and in actual combat were sufficient to carry out research and evaluate the research results.

During the coming period, with the mission of applied and developmental research along the lines of modernity and the requirement of attaining high quality and effectiveness, the research task must be carried out basically and systematically. We must assure a great volume of calculations in order to select the best formulas. There must be experiments in order to prove theories; there must be precise measurement data to reach conclusions on a specific research topic before beginning the following research topic; and there must be very meticulous experiments in order to have a basis for evaluating the results of research and design with certainty. We may affirm that, with the present research mission, if there are no appropriate modern material-technical bases the research projects cannot be carried out correctly.

The machinery and equipment used in experimental research is always more modern than that used in production, in order to assure the quality of research and the reliability of the research results. In the various countries, rather large sums of foreign exchange must be invested to purchase the most modern experimental research equipment. Modern equipment allows us to apply the advanced research methods, reduces the experimentation time, and assures that the experimental results are of high quality and reliability and attain great economic effectiveness even in the research process itself, and after the research results have been brought into production.

3. Developing the scientific information task and strengthening the capabilities of cooperation in research.

The world's scientific-technical revolution is developing at a rapid rate and is bringing about new accomplishments daily and hourly in all spheres. In that common treasury of mankind, both the large nations and the small nations have contributed, depending on the strengths and superiorities of each nation. No nation, no matter how great its scientific-technical potential, can by itself resolve all problems with the highest effectiveness, without needing to carry on the work of and cooperate with the other nations. For that reason, recently scientific information and international cooperation have been regarded as important elements of the scientific-technical potential.

With regard to us, with such tiny scientific-technical potential at present, during future years it will be even more necessary that our scientific-technical research be carried out creatively. Only then can we deal with the modern military scientific-technical problems with a force of cadres and material-technical bases that are not very large quantitatively. Therefore, information and cooperation have even greater importance under our circumstances. Books, newspapers, journals, forecasts, notices, scientific documents, technical documents, inspection visits, international conferences, exchanges, etc., are the principal forms of the information task. There must be organization and planning for the good carrying out of the division of labor and cooperation between the scientific-technical organs in the army and those of the state, and cooperation between our country and the fraternal socialist countries, in many appropriate forms.

We must carry out the information and cooperation tasks, assemble the extensive scientific-technical forces in the army and throughout the nation, and obtain as much international cooperation and aid as possible. We must think night and day in order to have creative measures to transform those capabilities into reality, and regard that as an important lever for promoting our scientific-technical undertaking and advancing it rapidly to the world modernity standards.

4. Perfecting the network of research organizations.

The scientific-technical mission of our army during the coming period demands that there be a complete organizational network consisting of the research bases and research management organs.

On the basis of a certain force of cadres and material-technical bases, how must we organize research in order to develop the spirit of creativity and the ability to fulfill the research missions to the highest possible degree, under specific circumstances? That is also an extremely complicated scientific problem which many countries are now concerned with studying. The networks of research organizations of the various countries are not identical. Within a country, the organization of research is continually adjusted so that it may be appropriate to the development of the research missions and the research forces.

One of the basic problems in organizational science is how to resolve as well as possible the contradiction between concentration and dispersion.

The leadership and guidance of research absolutely must be concentrated in order to guide all creative capabilities on serving the principal goals of the army's development and combat missions. There must be a capable scientific staff organ to assist the Central Military Party Committee by recommending directions, missions, mottoes, principles, policies, systems, and the basic contents of the research plans and by organizing guidance to fulfill the plans.

With regard to the organization of the research bases, it must be both concentrated and dispersed. It must be concentrated in order to form large research centers with powerful scientific-technical cadre forces and sharp scientific-technical sectors and modern equipment, in order to resolve with the greatest possible effectiveness modern military scientific and technical problems which usually have the nature of combining many different scientific and technical sectors. Those research centers also have the effect of assisting with regard to academic matters and assuring the technical aspects of the research of the other bases. It must be dispersed in order to form a network of research bases which are integrally related to actual production of the troops, in order to rally the broad forces of the scientific-technical cadres to effectively participate, directly or indirectly, in research and create conditions for rapidly bringing the results of research into actual use.

What the ratio between concentration and dispersion should be is determined by the missions and requirements of research and the actual capabilities. If the requirement of research is to rapidly advance to modernity, with regard to organization concentration must be emphasized, and special attention must be paid to building common scientific centers for the entire nation and the army. If we stress advancing to modernity under the conditions of the scientific-technical potential being limited and there being few sector-leading cadres and guidance cadres at the base level, it is even more necessary to stress concentrated organization, stress selected research, and enter deeply into the leading sectors of science and technology. Only by the early formation of scientific centers can we achieve the motto "research must keep a step ahead," and only then can we serve as well as possible the future production and combat missions.

3. Promoting the scientific-technical activities, outstanding fulfilling the immediate research missions, and positively preparing for the long-range research missions.

1) The immediate research missions are intended to exploit and use with high effectiveness, maintain over a long period of time, and do a good job of repairing and maintaining, the existing weapons and technical equipment, including the equipment provided us by the socialist countries and the equipment we recently captured from the enemy.

We must endeavor to, within a short period of time, research and investigate in order to grasp the design functions and characteristics, and the structural characteristics of the modern weapons and equipment, especially the weapons and equipment captured from the enemy, draft training materials, improve the usage ability of the cadres and men, and introduce such weapons and equipment into the basic training curricula of the schools with give elementary and advanced training to officers and noncommissioned officers. We must carry out basic studies and collect the necessary technical data in order to correctly evaluate the period of use of the modern weapons and equipment and, on that basis, have policies for rationally using them and promptly recommending the specific requirements regarding the task of assuring technical aspects.

We must pay all-out attention to researching the technical maintenance measures and regard that as a very important and urgent research content at present. We must pay special attention to long-range maintenance in order to assure that our strategic stockpiles are always combat-ready. That is a new problem for us. In the past, although we had to maintain weapons, ammunition, and the other kinds of equipment under very difficult circumstances -- in caves and tunnels, in humid camps, during transportation, and in combat areas -- the period of maintenance was not long. Therefore, although when in use their quality declined to a degree, in most cases they met the combat requirements. At present, peacetime maintenance, under the conditions of our country's hot, humid climate and over a long period of time, that is a true challenge for tropical science and technology. But we must resolve that problem by all means. In addition to research, we must be concerned with

fully assuring the organizational and material-technical aspects in order to utilize the research results that have been attained in actual maintenance, and disseminate them widely and form them into professional maintenance practices.

In the repair task the central problem that must be resolved is that of replacement parts. We must endeavor to employ advanced technology to continually improve our capability to restore and produce replacement parts as rapidly and economically as possible. Under our specific circumstances at present, when the metallurgical industry and machinery technology have not yet developed, and when there are many instances in which we cannot import some necessary parts or the special materials needed to manufacture those parts, the restoration technique is the only method to resolve the problem. Of course, the basic matter is still to advance to combining the state's metallurgical industry, materials industry, and engineering technology to produce the various kinds of replacement parts, machinery, electrical machinery, and the various types of electronic materials and components. Only then can we truly take the initiative with regard to repairs. That is also a transitional phase in which national defense production can advance stably.

The management of equipment and technical materials must be raised to the status of a science, and researched as if it were a science. We must research the application of the accomplishments of managerial science and of applied mathematics, with modern calculating instruments, in order to gradually create good management of technical equipment in our army. Only thereby can we accurately and promptly grasp the quantitative and qualitative situation, rapidly create optimal utilization, and assure the increasingly higher requirements regarding precision and timely combat command under modern conditions.

Essentially, the above-mentioned scientific-technical problems in the immediate research missions of our army are also problems which are being posed in the economic sphere. Therefore, there must be extremely close coordination between the research organs and the industrial bases within and without the army in assigning research tasks and producing the maintenance materials and replacement parts, and in notifying one another of their research results and widely exchanging experiences among the relevant sectors. Only thereby can we utilize the broad scientific-technical forces within and without the army, and rapidly meet the over-all requirements of the economy and of national defense as rationally and as effectively as possible.

2. Our long-range research mission is to advance to being able to research, design, and manufacture in our country the necessary modern equipment to supply to our armed forces and to effectively cope with the technical equipment of the enemy in future wars to defend the Fatherland, with increasingly higher and very new requirements. Therefore, the long-range research will, during the next few years, be principally of a preparatory nature: to concretize the long-range plans and create scientific-technical potential in all respects, in accordance with the directions and missions that are set forth.

We must carry out the various aspects of that preparatory work not apart from reality but by means of actual scientific activities in testing our modern equipment models and those of the enemy basically and systematically, and in carrying out research of an exploratory nature in the technical development research topics, along modern lines and in accord with our capabilities regarding cadre forces and material-technical bases. In addition to the other measures, actual scientific activities with the above contents are a very important measure for cultivating cadres, and allow us to accumulate valuable experiences in the sphere of modern design and technology, an aspect in which the scientific-technical research cadres are still weak and which we cannot resolve in the curricula in schools. Those actual scientific activities will also provide additional materials for research, concretize the long-range plans, improve and perfect the professional research organization, recommend the specific requirements regarding the development of the material-technical bases, in a manner appropriate to the missions and requirements of research.

4. Greatly improve the work formulas and create scientific work styles that are appropriate to the research situation and missions in the new phase.

Under the wise leadership of the Party, under wartime conditions, the scientific-technical revolution of our country in general and in our army specifically made great accomplishments and contributed worthily to the nation's glorious victory. But under the conditions of prolonged, fierce warfare, on the basis of a scientific-technical potential that was still very small, the accomplishments that were achieved were only initial ones, at a time when the scientific-technical revolution in the world was continuing to advance rapidly in the countries with better conditions for development than ours. Today, in the new situation, science and technology in our country and our army are facing new, very favorable advantages which create a strong transformation and are contributing to fulfilling the great strategic mission of building socialism throughout the nation and the mission of continuing to build a professional, modern people's army, build a strong national defense of all the people, and defend the socialist Vietnamese Fatherland. But transforming those capabilities into reality during a relatively brief historical period and catching up with the countries with modern industries and advanced science and technology is not an easy matter. It demands that our people and army make outstanding efforts and achieve wonderful accomplishments in peacetime development, just as in the past we achieved wonderful accomplishments in war.

We must advance on the new front with the status of victors, with bravery and intelligence, and with an iron will and creative, independent mind. If we are to catch up with people who are rather far ahead we must find a shortcut. If we are to create great strength we must know how to assemble the broad forces of the entire army and the entire nation, and combine strength in the nation with international assistance. In guidance, we must be extremely creative with regard to organization and must greatly improve the work formula and create scientific work styles, and there must be bold measures to promote the process of creating scientific-technical potential, opening the way for great, creative innovations and outstanding advances in scientific-technical research.

1) Improve the work formulas.

Scientific-technical research during the recent anti-U.S. resistance war for national salvation phase enabled us to learn many rich experience lessons. Some lessons pertain to very basic matters which must be applied and more strongly developed during the new phase. That is the spirit of revolutionary offense, the spirit of independence and autonomy and of daring to think and do. That is a realistic viewpoint, one of integrating research with the actualities of the battlefield and with our scientific-technical and industrial levels. It is a comprehensive viewpoint, one which closely combines science and technology with the political, military, and economic aspects. In addition, there were good experiences regarding specific organizational forms, formulas, and methods, which are integrally related to the characteristics of the actual situation, missions and circumstances at that time.

At present, scientific-technical research in our army has entered a new phase, the basic characteristics of which are shifting over from the phase of carrying out scientific-technical research in wartime in order to promptly meet the immediate combat needs to the phase of carrying out scientific-technical research in peacetime to serve as effectively as possible the mission of combat-readiness development. Of course, the present research task also has very important immediate missions, but with new, much higher requirements.

With regard to research in wartime, the element of time is of foremost importance. Furthermore, our scientific-technical and industrial capabilities were still very limited, so the requirements of research were not all-inclusive, but were intended principally to promptly meet the combat requirements. Therefore, we could not yet enter into researching the various problems basically and systematically. All results in research had to immediately be brought into production, training, and combat, and on that basis we had to gain experience in order to continue to further research and improve them. That was a very correct work formula which was appropriate to the specific circumstances of the recent war. There were many research results which were not yet complete, and the scientific-technical level was not yet high and could meet only part of the requirements of combat, but because they were applied at the right time they contributed importantly to victory on the battlefield. Furthermore, that work formula, which was prolonged over many years, caused a considerable number of scientific-technical cadres to have a way of thinking and a work style that were not appropriate to the scientific-technical research mission: simplicity, haste, regarding theory lightly, and being nimble toward the immediate specific problems but not being accustomed to the systematic and strategic way of looking at things.

The new situation and missions demand that military scientific-technical research rapidly advance to a modern status in order to serve the mission of developing the army and catching up with the advanced nations of the world. Therefore, in research we must, by all means, create professional systems and practices, must carry out research basically and systematically, and must

have modern scientific-technical knowledge, modern equipment, advanced research and experimentation methods, and a rice source of scientific-technical information. We must always focus on the long-range, strategic goals, firmly grasp the missions, requirements, and development of military science and art, base ourselves on the scientific-technical and industrial capabilities within the country, and closely adhere to the developmental tendency of the world scientific-technical revolution in guiding the various aspects of research in a planned manner and at an urgent rate, but with harmony and balance. Of course, that is not easily done. In changing scientific-technical research from wartime to peacetime with demanding developmental missions and requirements, under the present specific circumstances of our country we cannot avoid having to pass through a transistional period with difficulties regarding ideological consciousness, ability to carry out that work, the scientific-technical level and the level of implementation organization, or avoid temporary imbalances in the process of creating potential and influencing the effectiveness of the various immediate scientific activities. Therefore, we must be persistent and patient, endeavor to overcome all difficulties and obstacles, and resolutely advance.

Furthermore, when posing the matter of having to carry out basic and systematic research, we must guard against distorted tendencies that could arise, such as stressing science and lightly regarding technology, being absorbed with abstract theoretical matters which are removed from reality and production, or stressing modern research conditions, resulting in tieing our hands and waiting, and not being bold and creative in our thoughts and acts. At the same time, in addition to the direction of advance we must pay much attention to the immediate research missions, widely apply technical advances, rapidly bring research results into actual use, and promptly and effectively serve the missions of economic development and army development.

2) Forge a scientific work style.

If we are to do a good job of fulfilling the scientific-technical research mission there must be clear directions and missions, specific struggle goals, and powerful forces which dare to think and do and have increasingly higher understanding of science and technology, and at the same time there must be a scientific work style.

The forging of a scientific work style must be based on the nature and requirements of the scientific task. Science is a system of knowledge about the operational laws of nature, society and thought. Therefore, first of all a scientific work style must be a work style which relies on objective laws and which operates in accordance with laws, not sentiment or individual experiences. All things operate in accordance with common laws, but those common laws are manifested in the specific laws of specific things and phenomena. The rules, systems, regulations, specifications, etc. in the different spheres of the work reflect the separate laws of each specific aspect of the work. The scientific work style demands that we rely on the operational and developmental laws of things, and work with foresight, plans, and organization, and that we at the same time strictly obey the rules,

regulations, and standards in our work and oppose generality, arbitrariness, and liberality. We must stress the recapitulation of experiences in order to continually improve them and improve the work methods.

Scientific research is seeking the objective laws in order to apply them in reforming nature and society. The scientific work style in research must manifest a very high degree of dialectical unity between subjectivity and objectivity. On the one hand, we must be enthusiastic, bold, and very nimble toward the new, go all-out in supporting the new, and be persistent and patient in order to be certain of achieving our goals. But on the other hand we must be very objective and pay all-out attention to the careful and systematic collecting, analysis, and study of the documents and data obtained in actual research, experimentation, and testing, in order to prove our hypotheses and theories, or supplement and change them if in actuality they prove to be insufficient or incorrect. We must always make objective reality the standard of truth. We absolutely cannot be subjectively one-sided or conservative, or distort reality in order to be in accord with our subjective intentions. Faithfulness to reality, impartiality, respect for the truth, and daring defend the truth are very basic moral standards in the scientific task and are also fine manifestations of the scientific work style.

In our era science and technology are developing very rapidly, both along the lines of increasingly deeper specialization and along the lines of synthesizing the various scientific disciplines. Modern weapons and equipment constitute extremely complicated technical systems. Military science and technology demand the efforts of a large group of scientific-technical cadres and technical workers and personnel, with the participation of large numbers of command cadres and men throughout the process of research, computation, design, manufacture, testing, evaluation, and production. In research we must pay all-out attention to discovering and strengthening the creative capability. But a scientific-technical cadre, no matter how talented, can only make a certain contribution to that very great common mission. The knowledge of each person is in comparison to the common knowledge of the whole group very limited and is only within a certain sphere. Therefore, the scientific work style in research must be the work style of simultaneously studying, being modest and simple, having collective democracy, and uniting and cooperating with a spirit of socialist cooperation. Manifestations of self-pride and self-satisfaction, becoming satisfied and slowing down, particularism, and partialism are entirely foreign to the nature and undertaking of the scientific work.

Our army's scientific and technical research mission in the new phase of the revolution is extremely great. The prospects for the development of our military science and technology are extremely worthy of enthusiasm.

Our corps of military science and technology cadres is enthusiastically advancing with a new spirit, a new capability, and a new work method, in order to be even more worthy of being a hard-core force with regard to science and technology of the entire army and, along with the entire population, successfully building the science and technology of our socialist Fatherland.

MILITARY AFFAIRS AND PUBLIC SECURITY

DEVELOPMENT OF STRONG BASE-LEVEL UNITS URGED

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[Article by Colonel Nguyen Nhu Nga: "On the Present Development of Base-Level Units"]

[Text] As we enter the new revolutionary phase our army has changed over from its combat mission to the missions of regular, modern development, being ready to fight to defend the Fatherland, and building the economy and socialism. Carrying out the resolution of the Central Military Party Committee and the instructions of the Political General Department, the units throughout the army have carried out the development of comprehensively strong base-level units, in order to consolidate, perfect, and improve the quality of the troops in all respects. Many places have begun to create a new, enthusiastic spirit and a new emulation movement, are doing a good job of fulfilling their missions, and are getting all activities of the units on the right track. A number of weak, deficient units have undergone clear transformations, and negative phenomena have gradually declined. The development of base-level units is gaining good momentum. Actualities have affirmed that, no matter what the circumstances and conditions, if the party committee echelons and the chadres in charge have a high degree of determination and are able to mobilize the masses to participate in developing the units, and closely combine the development of the political, military, technical, and rear services aspects, then within a short period of time it is possible to transform the base-level unit situation with regard to thought, organization, and life styles, so that they may be appropriate to the new missions. On the basis of the results that were attained during the recent period we have brought up a number of matters regarding the guidance and organization of the development of base-level units in the present situation and missions.

First of all we must clearly realize that the development of base-level units is an important permanent mission, a key element in the development of strong regiments, divisions, and corps, and in view of the new requirements at present it is also an urgent task to which the party committee echelons and

the cadres in charge should give their all-out attention. It arises from the base-level unit's position as the army's foundation organization, the unit which directly carries out all lines and policies of the Party and the missions of the army, which educates and forges cadres, Party members, and enlisted men, and which manages and uses all weapons, equipment, and material-technical bases. Only if the base-level bases are stable can the large units be strong. Strong units must have strong Party committee echelons, strong organs, a skilled corps of command cadres, and strong base-level units. Furthermore, base-level units often undergo changes with regard to missions, circumstances, operational conditions, and organization. If they are to continually meet the requirements of their missions, the base-level units must be continually developed in all respects. The more the army develops, advances to a regular, modern status, and engages in large-scale production labor, the more it is necessary to continually be concerned with developing the base-level units. In actuality, whenever and wherever the development of base-level units is relaxed, at that time or at that place the missions of the unit are not fully implemented and there immediately appear negative phenomena in many respects, no matter how good that unit's tradition had been in the past or how great its accomplishments were. On the other hand, units which continually pay attention to the base work always retain the quality of a strong unit, whether it has changed over from combat to development, whether it has been transferred from the rural areas and jungles to the cities and the newly liberated areas, whether its cadres change, etc. It may be said that the base development task is a continuous, uninterrupted, never-ending task.

But saying that the base development task is a permanent task does not mean that it should be carried out slowly or prolonged. In the present situation and missions, that is an urgent task. After the revolution has entered another phase and the revolutionary missions have changed, the organizations and people of the revolution must also undergo rapid and strong transformations so that they may be appropriate. With regard to people, we mean above all the corps of cadres and Party members; with regard to organization, we mean that above all the base-level units must undergo strong transformations. Only if the base-level units undergo transformations can the lines and policies of the Party be transformed into revolutionary acts by the masses and only then can we advance the revolution. If our troops are to fulfill the new missions at present they must be strongly developed, starting with the development of strong base-level units. Furthermore, the actual situation of our troops at present is posing the urgent requirement of having to develop base-level units. In the course of many years of combat our troops manifested the fine qualities and tradition of the People's Army, and manifested a spirit of determination to fight and win, a spirit of solidarity, and the characteristics of organization, discipline, and fulfilling all missions well. There appeared many heroic units and many Heroes of the People's Armed Forces. Today, during peacetime, those traditions are being strongly developed in the missions of developing the army, consolidating national defense, economic construction, and developing the nation. Those are strong-points of our troops. However, in the turning points of the revolution there are often phenomena in thought and organization which do not keep up with

actual development. Many units have not yet created a new revolutionary spirit and have not advanced uniformly, strongly, and in unison, and in some cases there are even the phenomena of slowing down and the revealing of weaknesses, deficiencies, and impediments in the fulfillment of missions. That is because they do not yet know how to strongly manifest subjective effort and have not yet been able to overcome the negative objective influences of society in the new operational environment. A very important and urgent problem being posed at present is to develop the basic traditional strengths of the troops and cause the base-level units to become strongpoints of support for developing strong units.

If we do not clearly recognize the permanence of the development of base-level units, at places and at times we may relax it, thus preventing the progress of the units from being uniform and stable. But if we do not realize the urgency of the development of base-level units at present, we cannot have determination to concentrate the correct degree of guidance in order to transform the troop situation and assure that the army victoriously fulfills all missions in the new phase.

The development of the base-level units is done in order to do a good job of fulfilling the immediate and long-range missions of the units. Base-level development and the fulfillment of missions are closely combined. In actuality there are still units which have still not realized that, and often separate base-level unit development from the fulfillment of the unit's missions. Such units believe that there cannot be enough time to do both at the same time, and that to concentrate on one they will have to lessen the other. Therefore, only when they have free time do they concern themselves with base-level development, and when they have many missions and tasks base-level development is temporarily postponed or is done superficially, which gradually leads to abandoning it altogether. In fact, base-level development is a base-level development is a basic task, and the more difficult a unit's missions are the more it must stress base-level development. The development of strong base-level units is done principally to create favorable conditions and orient all people and all organizations toward the fulfillment of missions. Regiments and divisions in which the base-level units are not tightly organized, in which many cadres and men do not concentrate their thoughts and efforts on fulfilling their missions, and in which discipline is lacking, the living conditions are poor, and the activities are disjointed are regiments and divisions which cannot do a good job of fulfilling the missions assigned them. Base-level unit development is carried out to create in the units a seething revolutionary spirit, a strong system of leadership organization, command organization, and mass organization, and a corps of cadres, Party members and enlisted men with good revolutionary virtue and good ability to act in order to fulfill missions. The development of base-level units is in accord with the fulfillment of missions and serves the fulfillment of the missions. It does not create impediments but enables the missions to be better fulfilled. In the positive development of base-level units it is necessary to perform some additional tasks and take a little more time, but by doing so it is possible to reduce the time needed to fulfill missions and increase the effectiveness and quality of work. Only by developing good

base-level units can we overcome the situation of doing much but achieving few results. Furthermore, only by developing the base-level units in the course of fulfilling the new missions can there be lively and practical contents. In reality, there can be no strong units if unit development is separated from the unit's political mission, or if there is only concern for fulfilling missions and not for development, the missions cannot be well fulfilled. Strong organization does not result from time spent on development alone, but the best, most correct, and most effective method is to closely combine development with fulfilling missions in order to advance the unit. Precisely, in the resistance war, our army had to simultaneously develop and fight, develop even while fighting, and develop in order to fight. For that reason, the more we fought the stronger we became and the stronger we became the greater victories we won. Today, we have favorable conditions for creating base-level units at all places and at all times in training, in combat readiness, and in production labor and work, at times of concentration as well as times of dispersion, and when fulfilling urgent missions as well as when relatively free. With regard to any mission, whether army development, combat readiness, economic construction, or developing the nation, it is possible to combine the development of base-level units with all contents of improving thought, improving leadership, developing the strength of the organization at the base level, managing the lives of the troops, etc. Actuality has shown that when circumstances and conditions are similar there are analogous advantages and difficulties, but in the units which know how to carry out base-level development, then even if they are busy with many missions, the cadres' sense of responsibility is strengthened, the various aspects of their work are improved, and the unit's activity spirit is seething, which creates a new strength with which to fulfill well all missions that are assigned.

In the past, due to the requirements of the missions and because of the circumstances of dispersed activity in the liberation war, the development of base-level units was usually carried out in individual companies -- the degree of concentration was not great. At present we must and can develop base-level units on the scale of an entire regiment or division, with uniform, solid, comprehensive, and standardized requirements, in order to join the base-level units together more closely in the formation of large military units. That is because today our army is continuing to promote the development of a regular, modern people's army, in order to meet the requirements of the large-scale combined arms operational formula and readiness to fight to defend the socialist Fatherland under the conditions of modern warfare, while also fulfilling the economic construction mission and creating large-scale, modern socialist production. Many units are concentrated in camps and are equipped with new operational facilities in military work, political work, and rear services work. All activities of our troops in political education, military training, and production labor increasingly demand that there be clear standards, practices, and decisions in order to attain a high degree of standardization in entire regiments, divisions, and corps. In all tasks there must be a division of labor, decentralization, plans, and close cooperation between the upper echelon and the lower echelon, and among many units, in order to create the combined strength of an entire large unit.

Base-level development on the scale of an entire regiment or division can meet those requirements, is appropriate to the new circumstances and conditions, and at the same time creates great strength with a high degree of effectiveness and can create the unified operational style of regular military units even in peacetime conditions, in order to not only be prepared to meet the great requirements of combat but also to meet the great production requirements.

Developing base-level units, so that they advance uniformly, solidly, comprehensively, and in a unified manner, is a very high requirement.

Uniformity means that all base-level units advance and fulfill their missions similarly, with no weak or deficient units which adversely influence the strength of the whole regiment or division. A matter that must receive attention at present is the transformation of weak, deficient units into average units, and their advancement to the status of good, skilled units. That demands that there be a high degree of endeavor on the part of both the base-level units and the battalion, regiment, and division levels.

Solidly means that under all circumstances a unit must fulfill its missions and always be strong. Whether it operates in a large formation or its operation is dispersed, whether it has the direct guidance of the upper echelon or must operate independently, whether under ordinary conditions or under special conditions, and whether under favorable circumstances or difficult circumstances, the base-level units must fulfill their missions well. Thus we must always pay attention to developing base-level units, pay attention to the quality of the base level, and consolidate practices, and especially be concerned with the on-the-spot source of replacement cadres. We must be concerned with the basic supplementation of the corps of cadres and Party members, guide the application of principles under many different conditions, and develop the positiveness, initiative, and creativity of the cadres in charge.

Comprehensively means strong with regard to the military, political, and rear services aspects and to people, organizations, and material-technical bases, good fulfillment of missions, good training, combat readiness, production labor, good internal development, good work, good discipline, and good material and spiritual living conditions. That demands that there be comprehensive leadership by the party committee echelons, which continually pay attention to the various aspects, promptly rectify and supplement the various aspects, promote the activities uniformly, and cooperate closely with one another.

Unification is unification with regard to organization, systems, levels and work styles, and uniformity with regard to each category of troops: main-force units, local troops, and technical arms and economic construction troops. It requires an ending of the phenomena of liberality, arbitrariness, and the way of working of relying only on the experiences and customs of each place. It is necessary to unify the rules and regulations from the top on down, the most important matter of which is unification with regard to the

responsibilities of base-level cadres and enabling the cadres to have uniform levels and work styles.

Those specific requirements have clearly posed the necessity for the task of base-level development to be carried out on the concentrated scale of a whole regiment or division. In order to meet those requirements, the regimental and divisional echelons must not only give guidance with regard to directions and policies, but directly organize the implementation of the various aspects of developing base-level units. Everything, from cultivating cadres and political and military study to culture, physical education, and sports activities, the organization of living conditions, the practice of obeying orders and by-laws, etc., should be organized on the concentrated scale of a regiment. Even production labor must be carried out according to a common plan for a regiment or division, with assigned areas, orientation, organization, techniques, and vertical coordination, in order to create high productivity. It may be said that base-level development on the scale of a regiment or division not only enables the unification of all activities but also creates rich, lively forms, promotes an enthusiastic and seething spirit, and stimulates the movements. The problems that are posed are that the cadres at the various levels must have a new awareness and undergo a new transformation regarding the scale on which the unit is developed, that the work be done on a large scale, that there be specific plans and direct organization of their implementation, that the work not just be done thoroughly in a few units but enables all units of a regiment or division to advance strongly, and that the practices of giving a free hand to lower echelons, giving superficial guidance, carrying out the work in a dispersed and scattered manner, having a lackadaisical manner, etc., which are influences of small-scale production, be resolutely abandoned.

In developing base-level units, another general rule is to develop strong people and strong organizations, with regard to the military, political, and rear services aspects, in order to fulfill all missions of the Party and the army.

First of all, we must develop truly good people, new, socialist people who are combat-ready and produce well. In the base-level units, there are four categories in the development of people: cadres, Party members, Youth Group members, and enlisted men. We must do a good job of developing all four categories, but the central concern is developing the corps of cadres and Party members, enabling the cadres to develop their hard core effect and the Party members to maintain their vanguard, exemplary role. Nearly all members of all forces of those categories in the base-level units are youths. In the process of cultivating the various categories in the base-level units, we must firmly grasp the characteristics of youths and fully develop their strengths, especially their seething revolutionary spirit, their great dreams, their like for the new, and their brave fulfillment of all difficult missions. We must pay attention to cultivating youths with regard to the revolutionary ideals and struggle traditions and cause youths to always have a high degree of determination to outstandingly fulfill all missions, with a high degree of consciousness of organization and discipline, a spirit of

comradely solidarity, tight ranks, and love and respect for the people, to strengthen their consciousness of organization and discipline, and to have a civilized, wholesome way of life. The most important matter to arrive at unified action is to educate everyone so that they may fully understand their responsibilities. Cadres, Party members, Youth Group members, and enlisted men must understand, memorize, and work in accordance with their responsibilities. If everyone fulfills their responsibilities, even in a base-level unit of hundreds of people the actions are united as if one.

In addition to developing people we must also develop strong organizations and enable our army's units to truly be military organizations which have strong combat strength and the capability to engage in large-scale labor. A strong organization capable of multiplying the talent and intelligence of people, reforming and educating the backward elements, and advancing the unit. At present the organizations of the base-level units include the Party chapters, the Ho Chi Minh Lao Dong Youth Group chapters, the three-man cells, the military personnel councils, and the squads, platoons, and companies. Because they have separate functions, missions, and characteristics, each organization has its own development requirements. But the principal direction of development is to enable those organizations to develop their effect, fully carry out their responsibilities, always operate with good systems and practices, and be capable of furthering the good fulfillment of all missions of the entire unit. There is a close relationship among the organizations in the base-level units. Each organization both fulfills its function and coordinates closely with the other organizations in accordance with the rules that have been determined, are not dependent on or do not lean on one another, and do not duplicate one another's work or become separated from one another. We must especially pay attention to developing the leadership effect of the Party chapters and the assault effect of the Youth Group chapters.

If good results are to be attained in developing base-level units, the cadres at the various levels must clearly realize their responsibility, have enthusiasm and a strong sense of responsibility, and have deep and close work styles and specific, practical, and meticulous measures. The development of base-level units is not merely the work of the cadres and men at the base level. Whether a base-level unit is strong or weak to a very large degree depends on the implementation guidance and organization of the echelons above the base level. All echelons have responsibilities toward the base level. There must also be close coordination between the upper echelon and the lower echelon. The more attention the upper echelon pays to the lower echelon, the more contradictions are created for strong development. If the upper echelon is lax it is easy for negative phenomena to appear in the lower echelon.

To pay attention to developing base-level units is to manifest correct mass viewpoints, for it correctly meets the aspirations of the masses, who are demanding care in all respects in order to be fully capable of advancing to the fulfillment of the new missions. Under all circumstances of activity of our army, the various echelons must pay attention to the base level and

orient themselves toward it. In the final analysis, the activities of all echelons are intended to assure that the base-level units victoriously fulfill all missions. To be concerned with developing base-level units is also to manifest the revolutionary nature of the army. In our army, the upper-echelon cadres are always concerned with the lower-echelon cadres and with the enlisted men. That is concern for both their spiritual and material lives, with regard to both thought and organization, and concern that the cadres and men in the base-level units have sufficient quality and ability to fulfill their missions. There must be concern for the men while they are still in the unit and after they have been discharged, return to their localities, or are transferred to other combat positions. Under the present conditions, when our country has just been liberated and our society is still experiencing many difficulties, our army's missions are very new, and the organization of base-level units is being perfected, the concern of the various echelons toward the base-level units has an even more decisive significance. Only if the various echelons show full concern and manifest all-out care, correctly carry out the stands and policies of the Party and state, and are able to avoid all regrettable deficiencies, can they cause the cadres and men in the base-level units to be enthusiastic, be at ease, sympathize with the common difficulties, maintain discipline, and unite in order to fulfill the missions.

If the development of base-level units is to be well-guided, we must profoundly understand, and skilfully carry out, the base-level task. The base-level task is a very rich, comprehensive task. Only by being skilled in the base-level work can guidance be close and accurate. The base-level work must be guided not only to set forth requirements and disseminate requirements, and is not limited to clarifying those requirements and then giving a free hand to the lower echelon, but is done to truly help the base-level resolve the difficulties, and we must know how to carry out that work under all circumstances and conditions. There must be a deep and close work style. We must have clear knowledge of the meals and living quarters of the troops, their health, their reading material and activity facilities, what specific measures need to be taken, etc. The more deeply and closely the lower echelon is observed, the more effective implementation organization will be.

The results of base-level unit development are also in part dependent on the measures taken to carry out that work. There must be comprehensive plans for developing base-level units that are appropriate to each unit which is principally a training and combat-ready unit, or which is principally a training and combat-ready unit, or which is principally a production labor unit, etc. On the basis of those plans there must be a clear division of responsibility among the various echelons and organs, and close cooperation must be organized among the various elements. We must continually inspect and supervise, evaluate results, preliminarily recapitulate and summarily recapitulate experiences, point our progressive examples, overcome weaknesses and deficiencies, and encourage the average units. The work must be carried out both comprehensively and selectively, each task must be completed definitely, and each unit must be transformed, by all means.

We are determined to, within a reasonable period of time, rapidly develop strong base-level units of both the main-force troops and the local troops, so that they may advance uniformly, solidly, comprehensively, and in a unified manner. That demands that the cadres at the various levels carry out the base-level work with an extremely active spirit, and that they especially pay attention to implementation organization, and encourage everyone to participate in creating a deep and broad movement throughout the army to serve as a solid basis for developing strong regiments, divisions, and corps.

With the existing experiences and the new advantageous conditions, and with the enthusiastic spirit and ardor of all cadres and men, in the common enthusiastic atmosphere of the people of the entire nation, who are beginning the enterprise of building a rich and strong socialist Vietnamese Fatherland, our troops, full of pride and confidence, are determined to effectively achieve the policy of developing strong base-level units and fulfill all missions assigned by the Party and state during the new revolutionary phase.

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MILITARY AFFAIRS AND PUBLIC SECURITY

GUIDANCE OF ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT IN MILITARY REGION 7 EVALUATED

Hanoi TAP CHI QUAN DOI NHAN DAN in Vietnamese No 10, Oct 76 pp 56-62

[Article by Major General Nguyen Van Bua: "The People's Armed Forces on the Economic Development Front: Military Region 7 Guides Economic Development Troops"]

[Text] After the resolutions of the Political Bureau and the Central Military Party Committee regarding the army's economic work, during a brief period of time in which they had to simultaneously assure many difficult, new, urgent and complicated tasks of the post-war period, the Military Region Lao Dong Party Committee and Command of Military Region 7 concentrated the guidance of the entire Military Region on fulfilling the immediate central mission of mopping up the enemy troop remnants and stabilizing the situation, while gradually deploying to fulfill the economic construction mission.

The cadres and men of the entire Military Region are realizing with increasing clarity that the production labor-economic development mission is a basic mission of our army during the new phase, and also clearly realize the very close relationship between the Military Region's development mission and its combat readiness mission and everyone's duty and responsibility on the new front -- the front of building socialism and developing the country. From the organs to the units, and from the main-force troops to the local troops and the mass armed forces in the Military Region -- all are in unanimous agreement and are determined to fulfill the glorious labor obligation assigned by the Party, the state, and the Ministry of National Defense. Before beginning large-scale production, the units took the initiative in gradually overcoming their difficulties with regard to manpower, capital, equipment, materials, and levels in order to do a good job of fulfilling the immediate production missions and the mission of building camps to assure that the troops have long-range living quarters.

Group 6 restored and cleared nearly 1,500 hectares of jungle land and planted 1,065 hectares of rice and 150 hectares of manioc, sugarcane, and the various kinds of beans. Group 3 cleared jungle wasteland in order to create slash-burn fields and planted more than 500 hectares of rice, corn, potatoes, and

manioc. Group 2, simultaneously assembling its forces and positively increasing production, was able to grow more than 200 hectares of corn and manioc. At present the entire Military Region is determined to overcome all difficulties in order to produce and contribute to resolving the post-war grain problem, while positively engaging in basic construction, clearing wasteland, and reclaiming thousands of hectares of forest land. All of those tasks are intended to create the necessary conditions and the material-technical bases, and are at the same time intended to gain experience so that in 1977 the entire Military Region can begin a large-scale economic construction plan, along the lines of the state's division of labor.

Although the above accomplishments are still small in comparison to the very great missions and economic work capabilities of the Military Region's armed forces, they have a very important significance. They have contributed to creating a basis on which the Military Region's main-force units can deploy their forces on a large scale in future years. They prove the great strength and the latent capability of the Military Region's troops in the economic development mission. It has contributed to enabling everyone and all echelons to be more confident and to be determined to advance strongly on the economic construction front. At the same time, they have brought about for the Military Region a number of very useful experiences regarding leadership, guidance, command, economic organization and management, production management, etc.

With regard to Military Region 7, there are many advantages for fulfilling the economic development mission, but it is a very new mission. The Military Region's armed forces have a high degree of determination but they do not yet have experience, and their specific technical, specialized-professional, and economic management and organization and ability levels are still very limited. In order to outstandingly fulfill the missions, norms, and plans assigned by the state and the Ministry of National Defense, Military Region 7, with the assistance of the sectors and the economic organs inside and outside the army, is endeavoring to research and study the truly good resolution of a number of problems in guidance.

First of all, it is necessary to correctly determine the production directions and missions and closely combine the economic requirement and the national defense requirement.

Selecting the correct production directions is a strategic problem of the economic sectors and the production, commercial, industrial, agricultural, and other units. Only with correct production directions for each sector and production unit can the enthusiasm, talent, and strength of the laborers be developed in order to attain high labor productivity and great economic effectiveness and do a good job of fulfilling the economic missions, norms, and plans that are assigned.

With regard to the army, in the economic development mission the correct resolution of the production direction is not only an economic problem but also a national defense problem. It is directly related even to the

implementation of the socialist construction line and mission and the national defense development line and mission of our Party and state in the new revolutionary phase.

Therefore, in the process of leading and guiding the troops fulfilling economic development missions, we must pay much attention to selecting and determining production directions. The actualities of economic guidance during the recent period show that the over-all production direction of the entire Military Region, as well as the specific production directions of each unit and locality, must be fully understood and must be manifested in the following matters:

First of all, fully understanding the economic construction and development lines, missions, and guidelines of the Party and the economic directions, missions, norms, and plans of the state and the army.

Assuring the exploitation, full utilization, and development of the existing strengths of the Military Region and the production areas, consisting of the people, the organizations, and the economic-technical elements and existing natural geographical conditions, in order to overcome all difficulties and fulfill and surpass the norms and plans that are set forth.

All production and economic construction activities must be concentrated on the most important spheres and projects, which have decisive importance toward the development of the national economy and have the direct effect of consolidating national defense. If a sphere of production or an economic project helps fulfill the economic construction and socialist construction mission of the Party and state, then no matter how difficult we must be determined to fulfill it. If any production mission meets the demands of the consolidation of national defense and of defending the security of the Fatherland and the Military Region in the immediate future and in the long run, then no matter how arduous it is we must be resolved to fulfill it, and it must not be based on purely economic considerations.

In that spirit, the Military Region's economic construction direction during the coming years will be "concentrating the ardor, intelligence, ability and strength of the entire Military Region in clearing and reclaiming wasteland and creating new economic areas, in combination with the requirement of consolidating national defense, while making afforestation, forestry, and wood processing the principal concerns." The entire Military Region has been divided into many different economic areas and zones, with plans which are different but which are in accord with the unified economic plans of the state and of the localities. Every economic area has natural geographical conditions with which to meet the requirements of the economic construction and development mission, and also manifests the close combination of economics with national defense and agriculture and forestry with industry. Each area must be developed into a socialist economic strongpoint, and at the same time a comprehensively strong national defense strongpoint. If it is a place with no people or few people, the Military Region's troops must take the lead, serve as the assault force, and be a source of support on which the state and the locality can effectively carry out economic regionalization and redistribute labor.

During the next 5 to 10 years the Military Region will strive to create a number of new economic areas in a number of different areas, with relatively solid initial material-technical bases, and gradually get the economic, political, military, cultural, and social aspects on the right track.

In order to victoriously attain that great, long-range production direction, the deep, comprehensive study of the various aspects -- the economic, technical, geographical, and other aspects -- has been carried out in order to determine the norms and plans, and measures to attain it step by step. But during the immediate future the Military Region will simultaneously promote wasteland clearing and reclaiming and endeavor to invest labor and capital in capital construction, in order to gradually create material-technical bases and the projects which directly serve the production missions and meet all needs with regard to the troops' living conditions.

Stabilizing organization and managing and utilizing labor forces are very complicated problems which must be resolved truly well.

In order to have a strong labor force which is capable of fulfilling the economic construction mission, the Military Region has studied and resolved the problem of organizational tables, the central concern of which is resolving the problem of balance and rationality among the forces engaged principally in the combat readiness mission and the forces engaged principally in economic construction, in order to assure the good fulfillment of both the mission of defending the Fatherland and the mission of economic construction in the area of operations of the Military Region. At the same time, it has paid attention to developing and perfecting the specialized-professional guidance organs at the various levels and the units which engage directly in economic construction.

With regard to the forces engaged principally in economic construction, it is necessary to, on the basis of the specific production directions and missions, appropriately reorganize the units. Although the organizational forms and structures must be very flexible, no matter what the form or structure it is necessary to maintain the nature of an army unit. Only thereby can we develop the strength of the unit in the labor missions and combine the labor requirement with the combat-readiness mission, and combine the economic construction mission with the mission of developing the unit along regular, modern lines.

With regard to the units engaged principally in the mission of combat-readiness, while also fulfilling the mission of economic construction, it is necessary to organize them in accordance with the requirements of their missions. With regard to the organs of the various echelons, from the Military Region to the regiments, the Military Region has the policy of gradually developing them into apparatus that are strong with regard to politics and thought, tight with regard to organization, and expert with regard to specialized and professional matters. The organs must effectively serve the party committee echelons and the military commanders in both the combat-ready mission and the economic construction mission. Organization must be

streamlined, light, and have appropriate numbers and high quality. The managing cadres at the various echelons and the key cadre aides must have revolutionary ardor and a strong sense of political responsibility, love study, worship progress, and continually enrich both their military knowledge and their economic knowledge and strive to become cadres with broad knowledge of military science and economic science and with good leadership and command ability, and cadres who are also capable of doing a good job of economic management and production management.

In order to have such a corps of cadres it is necessary to pay attention to and do a good job of carrying out the selection, deployment, and arrangement of cadres and the supplementation and training of cadres in order to improve their levels and ability. With regard to the economic construction mission, a very new mission, it is necessary to organize and supplement a corps of cadres to directly fulfill the mission of leading and commanding the economic construction units, while going all-out to bring rear-service, military, and political cadres, and cadres and men with high scientific-technical and specialized-professional levels who have worked in the economic sectors, into the production guidance organs and the production bases. Only by such selection, deployment, organization, and cultivation and training of cadres can we create a corps of cadres sufficiently strong to fulfill the Military Region's immediate and long-range missions.

With regard to the organization of forces, many units, both main-force and local, have changed over to the principal mission of production labor and economic construction, in order to serve as the hard core in the creation of new economic areas and the development of the key economic sectors and trades. The matter of replacing and supplementing troops in order to stabilize organization and assure sufficient economic construction labor forces is a matter of foremost importance for the Military Region at present.

In order to resolve that problem, encouraging the older cadres and men to enthusiastically accept missions on the new front has received adequate attention. Most of the men are in the youth age group, are young and healthy and have good cultural levels, and have been comprehensively educated and forged in socialist schools and were tested in the fighting against the U.S. for national salvation in the past and in the all-out revolutionary struggle at present. They are also people who have fought and worked in the Military Region's area of operations, so all have definite knowledge of the political, social, and economic situations of the localities in the Military Region. There must be plans and measures for implementing all policies promulgated by the Party and state in order to cultivate and train the men so that they may become people with good techniques and high specialized levels, and skilled economic management cadres to serve as the solid hard core for the units fulfilling economic construction missions.

In addition to encouraging the older cadres and men to remain with the unit to fulfill the new missions, there are also plans to coordinate with the localities in the Military Region in order to do a good job of encouraging on-the-spot troop recruitment, in accordance with the military obligation

system, in order to promptly supplement the forces fulfilling the mission of defending the Fatherland and engaging in economic construction labor.

The combining of the military obligation and the labor obligation of youths while they are on active duty has a very great effect with regard to both the combat-readiness mission and the economic construction and socialist construction mission. It also contributes positively to training new, socialist people with a high level of political awareness, with good quality and virtue, with culture, and with both military and economic knowledge and ability, in order to serve as the hard corps for the task of building socialism in the localities and to serve as a powerful reserve force for the army.

Along with perfecting the labor forces it is necessary to clearly determine the guidelines and principles regarding the management and use of the labor forces, in order to avoid the waste of manpower and attain high labor productivity and work effectiveness.

The specialized-professional organs have the responsibility of serving as staffs for the Party committee echelons and the military commanders in the management and use of labor, in accordance with the economic policies, missions, and plans.

There must be a division of labor among production units and they must be assigned explicit missions and be used in a concentrated manner in the central economic missions and plans and in the important projects, according to the capabilities of each unit. Furthermore, it is necessary to study specialized directions in order to rapidly increase labor productivity and economic effectiveness.

In order to use labor forces rationally we must fully utilize and develop the labor capabilities of the cadres and men in order to fulfill with the best possible results the production missions that are assigned. Therefore, we must pay attention to developing in all ways the talents and experiences of all cadres and men and of all echelons and sectors: rear services, military, political, technical, specialized combat arms, etc., and know how to properly utilize cadres and men with high scientific-technical and specialized-professional levels in order to serve the economic construction mission. Furthermore, there must be additional skilled technical cadres and workers in order to resolve the necessary aspects of production and give vocational supervision to, and assist with regard to experiences in economic management and production management, the cadres and men.

Continually being concerned with cultivating labor strength is a major problem of decisive importance with regard to the reproduction of labor strength in order to increase labor productivity and produce with high economic effectiveness. Cultivating the troops' labor strength is a task which manifests the mass viewpoints and consciousness of being fully concerned with the spiritual and material lives of the cadres and men.

The cultivation of labor strength has been carried out comprehensively, with regard to the political, morale, and material aspects, and with regard to both the scientific-technical level and ability to organize economic management and production management, and labor skills.

Under the conditions of the Military Region having only recently begun to fulfill its economic construction mission, difficulties are still being encountered in many aspects of that task. But it is necessary to carry it out positively and continuously, gaining experience and making gradual improvements as we work.

With regard to political and morale cultivation, the Military Region follows the policy of concentrating all efforts of the party committee echelon, political organs, Youth Group chapters, and mass organizations in propaganda and education, in order to bring about a strong transformation in the consciousness and thought of the cadres, Party members, Youth Group members, and men throughout the Military Region with regard to the economic construction mission, and enable everyone to fully understand the resolutions of the Party Central Committee, the Political Bureau, and the Central Military Party Committee regarding the common revolutionary missions, the military missions, and the economic construction missions of the army in the new phase, and to clearly realize the advantages, good prospects, latent capabilities, and great political responsibility, while also fully realizing the difficulties and complications of the economic construction troops. The units, cadres, and men engaged principally in the economic construction mission must fully understand the above problems in order to create a solid basis for creating determination to become skilled production units and progressive laborers. Under the conditions of having to fulfill very urgent labor missions, the Military Region has still paid much attention to maintaining regular, high quality political-ideological activities, the political study sessions and the activities of the Party and Youth Group, and the cultural and artistic activities of the units. Emulation activities and promoted in accordance with the requirements and with contents appropriate to the labor missions. The political work activities which are of high quality and have rich, practical contents will contribute to strengthening the consciousness and thought of the troops and to developing a seething revolutionary spirit among the masses in production labor.

Material cultivation is an extremely important element, one which directly influences the combativeness and labor strength of the troops. After many years of arduous and fierce warfare, the health of the units' cadres and men deteriorated. If meticulous attention is not paid to their material lives, if their food ration level is not assured, if places for recreation and study are not created for them, and if there are no meticulous disease prevention measures, that will adversely affect the labor force and there can be no high labor productivity.

Since the war had only recently ended, the resolution of that problem was not simple and easy. In view of that situation the command cadres and organs of the various echelons overcame difficulties and sought all ways to stabilize

and improve the troops' living conditions. The labor mission had to be carried out by achieving the requirement that rear services had to keep a step ahead. Furthermore, it was necessary to tightly guide and strictly inspect the attainment of the systems and standards that had been promulgated, and have a strong sense of responsibility toward the material lives of the troops and oppose all instances of corruption, waste, violating public funds, and violating the rights of the men. At the same time, the matter of studying and gradually applying the state's economic policies is being carried out, in order to encourage everyone to enter deeply into production and increase labor productivity, for only on the basis of increasing labor productivity and economic effectiveness can material cultivation be rational and have a strong economic base.

Raising the scientific-technical and professional-technical levels in order to improve economic management and production management is a very urgent requirement for the fulfillment of the economic construction mission. Large numbers of leadership, command, and management cadres, and specialized, technical, and professional cadres at the various echelons, as well as the enlisted men, will be able to work while studying, study in training classes and schools, and study by means of preliminary and final recapitulation cycles. Some people are cultivated with regard to both the theory and practice of a certain sector or trade. Some are only cultivated with regard to a certain segment or type. With regard to some, cultural cultivation should be the principal concern, in order to have a basis for assimilating scientific, technical, and professional knowledge. With regard to some, study of the economic lines and policies and the national defense lines and policies and the national defense lines and policies should be the principal concern, in order to have a correct direction for utilizing their existing scientific-technical and specialized-professional knowledge in actual circumstances. That study must be made a responsibility, a compulsory matter for everyone. Each category must be cultivated practically and specifically, in accord with both its requirements and missions and its level.

Our entire population is endeavoring to attain the slogan "All for production, all to build socialism, all for a rich, strong Fatherland and the well-being of the people." Our entire army is urgently developing its forces and is prepared to fight to defend the Fatherland and enthusiastically and strongly enter the fight against poverty and backwardness, build socialism, and build the nation. As a Military Region which has great duties and responsibilities regarding both national defense and the economy, we are endeavoring to study, gain experience and overcome all difficulties and weaknesses in order to attain increasingly greater accomplishments in both the combat-readiness mission and the economic construction mission, and contribute to, along with the entire army, victoriously fulfilling all of the army's missions in the new phase of the revolution.

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MILITARY AFFAIRS AND PUBLIC SECURITY

PROGRESS IN CLEARING BOMBS AND MINES IN THE SOUTH DETAILED

Hanoi TAP CHI QUAN DOI NHAN DAN in Vietnamese No 10, Oct 76 pp 63-69

[Article by Lieutenant General Nguyen Ngoc Thanh: "Destroying and Disarming Bombs, Mines and Explosives To Restore Production"]

[Text] Destroying and disarming bombs, mines, and explosives is one of the most urgent tasks in the work of overcoming the aftereffects of the war, and is directly and very importantly related to our restoration of production and economic construction at present.

In their war of aggression against our country over a period of nearly 20 years, the U.S. imperialists and their lackeys utilized a very great quantity of the various types of modern bombs, mines, and shells, with much more sophisticated and complicated technology than those used in World War II. If in World War II mines were spread mainly by hand, during the war in Vietnam the U.S. imperialists used many types of mines dropped from airplanes, even B52's. For example, a mother bomb could scatter all at the same time nearly 2,000 "wing-nut" mines over an area as large as 30,000 square meters. All types of the U.S. mines have good resistance to dampness: some still explode when touched although they have laid on the bottom of flooded paddies 5 or 6 years. The U.S. imperialists also used many types of plastic-encased mines which the mine detectors ordinarily cannot detect. In some mine fields plastic-encased mines account for up to 50 percent of the total number of mines. The various types of bombs used by the U.S. imperialists were ordinarily long and tapering. They were released from jet planes at an altitude of more than 1,000 meters, so they penetrated as deeply as 10-15 meters below the surface of the ground, in contrast to the bombs used in World War II, which did not penetrate beyond 5 meters. Bombs, mines, and explosives are scattered about in many places in the South -- in villages and hamlets, in the paddies and fields, in the mountains and jungles, and in sandy coastal areas, both on land and in rivers. The greatest density is in the areas where many continuous battles were fought, in areas that were formerly enemy defnesive belts, and in the border areas. For example, in the Quang Tri-Thua Thien

area, by October 1975 we had destroyed or disarmed more than a million enemy bombs, mines, grenades, and artillery shells. In addition to the various types of bombs and mines there are also a very large number of unexploded shells of the various types which the enemy used indiscriminately all over, including types which explode very readily when touched, such as M79 grenades, fragmentation artillery shells, etc. Furthermore, in the course of the long war in our country bombs and shells were piled upon other bombs and shells, there was much rain and flooding, and vegetation grew rapidly, which makes the locating, detecting, and disarming of bombs and mines more difficult and complicated. Due to the characteristics of the enemy's use of bombs and mines, the sooner, the faster, and the more absolutely our present tasks of destroying and disarming them is carried out the better. The destroying and disarming of bombs, mines, and explosives has a very great significance with regard to the stabilization and normalization of the people's living conditions and the avoidance of casualties among our people and troops in the post-war period. It contributes positively to expanding the cultivated area in the rural areas, assuring safety for the construction sites, and promoting the restoration of production and economic development in the localities. Especially, with regard to the key agricultural, industrial, communications-transportation areas, etc., the destroying and disarming of all bombs, mines, and explosives, and the complete liberation of whole square kilometers of land from danger, it is very valuable. Recently some provinces have destroyed and disarmed explosives on, and thus liberated, areas of several tens of square kilometers in extent. That has had a very great significance economically, militarily, and with regard to assuring the people's living conditions.

It is estimated that the area on which bombs, mines, and explosives must be destroyed or disarmed in the localities in the South amounts to more than 3,000 square kilometers. Therefore, the task of destroying and disarming is even more pressing and urgent. The destroying and disarming of bombs, mines, and explosives has become a real struggle between our cadres, enlisted men, and people on the one hand and the complicated, difficult, and arduous dangers and challenges on the other hand. However, the actual experiences of the localities in the South prove that with the concern and leadership of the Party organizations and state organs from the central level to the local level, with the bravery, intelligence, cleverness, diligence, knowledge, and experience of the cadres and men of our armed forces and of the local people, we are entirely capable of defeating all difficulties and doing a good job of destroying and disarming bombs, mines, and explosives.

The actualities of the work of destroying and disarming bombs, mines, and explosives of the localities in the South of our country during the recent period prove that if we are to attain good results we must do a good job of both the ideological and organizational tasks, utilize forces rationally, have appropriate technical measures and facilities, and have tight leadership and command.

1. The experiences of the localities in organizing and utilizing forces to destroy and disarm bombs and mines show that first of all there must be formed

a broad mass movement, with the three types of troops of the people's armed forces serving as the assault forces and with the military engineers of the main-force troops serving as the hard core.

Our people are brave and creative, have been forged in a long war, and have much experience in coping with the enemy's bombs and shells. The local party committee echelons and administrations all have experience in leading and guiding production and combat. During the war we formed a vast network of people's military engineers to serve as the hard corps in planting mines and disturbing the enemy's lines of communication in the localities and on the battlefields. Those conditions allow us to launch a broad mass movement to completely eliminate enemy bombs and mines in the localities.

The mass movement to destroy and disarm enemy bombs and mines is a movement of the militia, self-defense forces, and young men and women at the production bases, state farms, work sites, and organs, mobilized and organized into concentrated forces in each particular period of time in order to destroy and disarm bombs, mines, and explosives in their areas. If the task of destroying and disarming mines is to become a broad, voluntary, and positive mass movement there must be meticulous education with regard to the nature of the work, so that everyone may realize the urgent requirement of the complete elimination of bombs, mines, and explosives in the new situation at present. In the areas which have carried out education well, everyone is enthusiastic and enlightened, for the destroying and disarming of bombs and mines is very much in accord with the people's aspirations -- everyone wants to do that work well so that they may travel safely and develop production in their localities.

Because of the broad participation of the masses, training the masses to destroy and disarm bombs, mines, and explosives has a very great significance. If there is good training in the destruction and disarming techniques, so that everyone can carry out destruction and disarming with effectiveness and good productivity, with assured safety, there will be even more conditions for consolidating and developing the movement. The experiences in many localities show that even though many of our youths in the militia and self-defense forces have accumulated much experience, they absolutely do not take training lightly. Whether troops or civilians, everyone participating in that work must be trained in accordance with the requirements that have been determined. Anyone who does not fully understand the structure of bombs and mines, is not well-versed in the destroying and disarming procedures and movements, and does not fully understand the safety rules is absolutely forbidden to participate in the destroying and disarming mission.

In addition to the broad participation of the people, the organization of units specializing in the destroying and disarming of mines on the scale of a platoon or company, at the district level or higher, is very necessary in order to completely eliminate bombs and mines in the key areas and in the difficult places. We may foresee that in the future, after the land area with bombs, mines, and explosives has been reduced there will remain the

difficult areas far from the people. In such cases the specialized units will become the principal forces. As for the present, it only the specialized units are used they cannot do all the work, especially in the provinces with must land on which there are bombs, mines, and explosives.

In order to develop the assault role of the people's armed forces in the destroying and disarming of bombs and mines, every main-force and local troop unit, no matter where it is stationed, must seek all ways to create conditions and find the time to participate along with the local people. Every unit must participate with a strong sense of responsibility, both directly undertaking destruction and disarming in a certain area and helping organize and train the local people.

Because of their continual utilization of the techniques of placing, destroying, and disarming bombs and mines, the military engineer troops must, and have the conditions to, manifest their hard-core role in that mission. That hard-core role is manifested first of all in studying and discussing the technical secrets of the enemy bombs and mines and the configuration and method of deployment of the remaining mine area; in recommending measures and methods of organizing destruction and disarming; in training, guiding, and supervising the other forces; in guiding and inspecting the observation of safety rules; and in directly undertaking the destruction and disarming of bombs and mines in the difficult, complicated areas which demand high technical standards.

The experiences in the organization and use of forces to destroy and disarm bombs and mines in the localities show that it is very necessary to develop the role of each force and closely combine the popular forces with those of the army and the military engineer forces and the other forces. No matter what the locality, the forces of the people, the militia, and youths are the most numerous forces, participate most frequently, and are capable of engaging in that mission continually and over a long period of time, without having to abandon production. Therefore, when they are used, educating, training, and organizing them, cultivating them spiritually and materially, implementing the policies, etc., are very important matters in order to fulfill the plans to completely eliminate bombs and mines in each locality. The main-force troops, local troops, and military engineer troops are forces with a high degree of organization, tight command, and technical facilities and equipment, so they have many conditions for participating in destroying and disarming bombs and mines in the localities, especially in the different areas, with high productivity. Therefore, although those forces account for a small percentage of the forces destroying and disarming bombs and mines, we must pay attention to fully developing their role and effect.

2. To achieve good results in destroying and disarming bombs, mines, and explosives on a large area, within a certain period of time, we must skillfully combine the use of the technical facilities and measures. Experience shows that under the conditions of our army and the localities in the South of our country at present, the most appropriate method is to combine primitive facilities with relatively modern and modern facilities, make wide use

of probing rods, mine detectors, mine detecting trucks, and mine detecting dogs. With regard to disarming mines we may disarm them directly by hand. With regard to destroying mines, we may use explosives, use tanks equipped to destroy mines, fire artillery and drop bombs, etc. Every facility and measure has its advantage and also has its definite limitations.

The destruction of mines is a measure often employed in combat. It is fast but does not completely destroy the bombs and mines and is very costly, so that method should not be used widely to clear mines in the post-war period. In clearing mines in the post-war period we must make wide use of the mine detection and mine disarming measures, using technically trained people, and using a combination of probing rods, mine detecting machinery, and explosives.

Mine detecting rods are sharp iron rods 6 to 8 millimeters in diameter. People holding rods lie on the ground and locate mines and explosives by eyesight and by feeling. Those are very widely used facilities and measures. If rods are used expertly and with experience, they are very effective. By the accurate use of rods it is possible to detect all types of mines absolutely and safely. Therefore, that measure should be stressed, and there should be training and the rapid dissemination of experiences in order to increase the skill of the people using rods. The type of mine detecting machine widely used at present can only detect mines with cases of steel or other metals. Machines to detect all types of mines have been manufactured but they have shortcomings. The ordinary type of mine detector can be used to go over a mine field after rods have been used to detect mines, and perhaps only mine-detecting machines, and not rods, should be used in mine fields in which it is certain that there are no non-metallic mines. The rate of mine detection by mine detecting machines can be 10 times faster than by the use of rods. By combining the use of rods, mine-detecting machines, and explosives, it is possible to detect, disarm, and destroy bombs and mines absolutely, safely, and economically. Furthermore, we are capable of supplying rods, mine-detecting machines and explosives to large forces. Therefore, with them, and with good training in the techniques of using them, it is possible to create great effectiveness. However, that measure requires much manpower and much time. Furthermore, the area in which it is necessary to completely eliminate bombs and mines in the localities is still quite great. Therefore, effort to apply modern mechanized technical measures and facilities to completely eliminate bombs and mines but still correctly assure the motto of absolute safety, speed, and economy, is a very great requirement. It is a major responsibility of the military engineers.

Because bombs, mines, and explosives are scattered about in the localities over large areas, and in many places are buried in sand and hidden by vegetation, detection, destroying, and disarming must sometimes be prolonged over a period of years. Therefore, correctly following the order of the various steps in that task and correctly meeting the technical requirements are matters which must receive all-out attention. It is necessary to fully understand the bomb and mine situation in each area, on the basis of many sources of documentation, such as the documents left behind by the Americans and their puppets, asking the local people, interrogating the former members

of the puppet army and administration who have undergone and are undergoing reform study, etc. It is necessary to reconnoiter, delineate, and mark places with bombs and mines, and draft plans for each area and each time to destroy and disarm bombs and mines in each district and province, in accordance with the requirements of restoring the economy and developing production and the different specific conditions of each locality. It is necessary to be extremely meticulous in the technical movements and the technical elements, from policing up the surface of areas with mines to detecting, using rods, marking, destroying, disarming, etc. The policing up of the surface of areas with mines is itself very complicated and could easily be dangerous, for there is much vegetation and many reeds, and iron and steel, barbed wire, etc., which were strewn about by the enemy. Therefore, no technical motion or technical aspect should be regarded lightly.

In the process of applying the measures of detecting, disarming, and destroying mines it is necessary to always pay attention to assuring safety and go all-out to avoid causing casualties. There are a large number of safety rules, which everyone participating in detecting, disarming and destroying mines must study and understand before beginning work, and they must strictly observe them in the course of fulfilling their missions. The command cadres must not only be exemplary in observing those rules but must continually supervise and oversee their observance. Actuality has shown that in the great majority of cases wounds inflicted in the course of detecting, disarming, and destroying mines have resulted from failure to strictly observe the safety rules. Laxity toward safety rules usually occurs on the part of young people who have detected and disarmed many mines and have experience, and usually occur near the end of the day, when they are tired, or during rest hours, when they are at play. Those are experiences which should receive all-out attention.

3. The results of the movement to destroy and disarm bombs, mines, and explosives in the localities prove that the direct leadership and guidance of the local Party committee echelons and administrations is indispensable and plays a decisive role in that task.

Generally speaking, in the localities in which there are still enemy bombs, mines, and explosives, the local Party committee echelons and administrations have clearly realized the characteristics of the task of destroying and disarming bombs and mines in the post-war period, and have realized the complexity of carrying out that work and the urgency of carrying it out well in order to assure safety for the people and eliminate the dangerous areas in order to increase the cultivated area and develop production in the localities. The (former) Quang Tri Provincial Lao Dong Party Committee regarded the destroying and disarming of bombs and mines as an urgent matter, a special ad hoc task which was related to the central mission of the entire province. The Provincial Party Committee decided to launch a campaign to destroy bombs and mines throughout the province and to set up a campaign guidance committee headed by two members of the standing committee of the Provincial Party Committee. Then vertical sector conferences were held at the various levels in order to fully explain the resolution of the Provincial

Party Committee and discuss measures for implementing it. Mobilizing large forces, with tight leadership, organization, and command, in the course of two successive campaigns, from May to December 1975 the province as a whole was able to destroy or disarm more than half a million bombs and mines of the various types and liberate more than 50 square kilometers of land on which there were explosives. Under the leadership and guidance of the local Party committee echelons and administrations, during the first 6 months of 1976 the South as a whole destroyed, disarmed, and collected nearly 600,000 bombs and mines of the various types and liberated 26,000 hectares of cultivable land.

The Party committee echelons led the destruction and disarming of bombs and mines in their localities by means of specialized resolutions, with the assignment of Party committee members to be in charge, developing the role of the governmental organs and mass associations, and using the local military organs as effective staffs. In many localities the Party committee echelons used the military organs to investigate, zone, and mark on maps, the areas with mines. That was regarded as the grasping of the enemy situation in combat, so it had to be done accurately. The township, district, province, and military region military organs all had to have maps on which the areas with mines are accurately marked and the number of mines and the characteristics of each mine area within their sphere of responsibility were clearly recorded.

Under the centralized leadership of the local Party committees (township, district, and province), the local military organs have developed their staff role in investigating and grasping the bomb and mine situation, drafting plans to destroy and disarm bombs and mines, and organizing, training, and commanding the forces destroying and disarming bombs and mines. Commanding the destroying and disarming of bombs and mines may be regarded as commanding in combat. No matter where or when, whether the forces are large or small, even if only one three-man cell is fulfilling the mission, it is absolutely necessary to have command. Only thereby can it be assured that the destroying and disarming is done in correct accordance with regulations and techniques, with high productivity, and with assured safety. Therefore, supplementary training in the techniques and methods of organizing and managing the destroying and disarming formations for the commanders directly commanding them, especially in the militia and self-defense squads, platoons, and companies fulfilling the mission of destroying and disarming bombs and mines, is an important requirement of the local military organs.

In the process of leading and guiding the campaign to destroy and disarm bombs and mines, in the localities the local Party committee echelons and administrations often reserve many very specific problems regarding the extent and time of the mobilization of the mine detection and disarming forces and the service forces (such as seamstresses to sew warning flags, blacksmiths to make probing rods, the information-culture sector to give encouragement, the commercial sector to give material service, the organization of first-aid and ambulance networks, etc.), and must be based on regulations and policies, in order to resolve the problems regarding messing and rest, spiritual and material supplementation, labor protection equipment,

praise and awards, etc., with regard to the mine-detection forces as well as the service forces. Due to the accumulation of leadership and guidance experiences during the wartime period and the grasping of the instructions, resolutions, regulations, and policies promulgated by the central level, the local Party committee echelons and administrations have had conditions for doing a good job of performing those tasks.

The experiences of the localities show that the matter of permanent significance, which determines all aspects-- preparing, mobilizing, and organizing forces, carrying out the destroying and disarming, assuring safety, etc. -- is the full grasping by the leadership and guidance echelons of the motto "absolutely, safely, rapidly, and economically." All bombs and mines must be destroyed and disarmed, without overlooking any, but destroying and disarming must be done urgently and safely, and even if the mined area is large the work should not be carried out too slowly, and casualties should not be allowed to happen. The work must be carried out rapidly and urgently, but with preparations, investigations, and the drafting and fulfillment of plans to destroy and disarm bombs and mines. It should not be done superficially, and carelessness should not be allowed to result in overlooking bombs and mines, to a loss of safety, etc.

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MILITARY AFFAIRS AND PUBLIC SECURITY

GENERAL DISCUSSES REAR SERVICES IN 1975 GENERAL OFFENSIVE

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[Article by Major General Tran Tho: "In the General Offenssive and Uprising of the Spring of 1975: Some Successful Lessons of the Rear Service Task"]

[Text] The general offensive and uprising of the spring of 1975, the high point of which was the historic Ho Chi Minh campaign, will always be remembered in the history of our people's wars to save and defend the nation as one of the greatest feats of arms. The general offensive signified the high point of our Party's revolutionary war guidance skill. It also signified the high point of the development of the military art of people's war, including the development of our army's rear service task. For the first time in the history of revolutionary war and people's war, the army's rear service task had to assure that one strategic annihilating battle after another could be fought to annihilate large mobile strategic corps of the puppet army, attack and take eaach of the enemy's strategic areas of operation, and attack and take cities and municipalities and even the last lairs of the traitorous puppet army and puppet regime. The rear service task had to assure marvelously rapid, bold offensive blows which utilized many large corps of combined arms mobile troops which penetrated deeply into the centers of the enemy's defenses and, in combination with uprisings, fought the enemy on both the outer perimeters and the inner perimeters and annihilated or routed large enemy military forces within a brief period of time. Within a period of only 55 days and nights, the rear service and technical sectors had to assure that our army could continuously increase its mobility and assault force and develop the greatest possible combat capability in order to, along with all our people, completely liberate all of our beloved South.

Never before had the rear service sector had to assure such a great, complicated volume of materiel and equipment and assure the mobility of such a large number of troops. The total quantity of weapons, ammunition, POL, food-stuffs, medicine, etc., amounted to hundreds of thousands of tons. The volume of materiel and equipment for each battle and each battlefield, as well

as for each unit and column, surpassed the previous records. The materiel and equipment to assure the Ho Chi Minh campaign alone amounted to approximately 60,000 tons. With regard to the composition of the materiel-technical supplies, POL and artillery shells of the various calibers always occupied the foremost position and accounted for the largest ratio. The requirements regarding the assuring of technical facilities were very demanding, for we used a very large quantity of tanks, armored vehicles, artillery, military trucks, etc. Especially, this time the military transportation sector had to transport hundreds of thousands of troops, nearly half of whom had to travel nearly 1,500 kilometers. They were main-force forces which formed powerful columns, along with the on-the-spot forces, to surround, attack and annihilate the enemy and win complete victory in the historic Ho Chi Minh campaign. Assuring an enormous, complicated volume of materiel and equipment and assuring the mobility of such a large number of troops, so that they could reach the right objectives at the right times, was a very great and very new problem for the rear service sector.

Never before had the rear service sector had to assure such rapid and urgent movement. Although we had made preparations several years in advance and had brought materiel and equipment to the battlefields in the South, in order to create very large stockpiles in the strategic areas of operation, the volume of materiel and equipment we had to continue to transport to the battlefields before the key initial battle was fought and during the course of the general offensive was even greater. The rear service forces had to act rapidly and boldly and take advantage of each hour and each minute to continue to transport additional tens of thousands of tons of materiel and equipment and assure the mobility of hundreds of thousands of troops in the various directions and in the strategic areas of operation. We had to take advantage of a good opportunity to strike large annihilating blows. We were able to prepare in advance for the Central Highlands campaign, but later, in order to assure the Hue-Danang, and especially the historic Ho Chi Minh campaign, the rear service task had to be carried out under very urgent circumstances. The effectiveness of the rear service task must be evaluated by both the volume and the rate of speed.

Never before had our rear service task had to be carried out at the same time over such large areas. At the front and in the rear, on the main battlefield and on the neighboring battlefields, in the mountains-and-jungle area, and in the lowland rural areas and cities, the rear service task of the main-force troops and local troops, of the mobile forces and the on-the-spot forces, and at the strategic, campaign, and combat echelons, operated simultaneously, at a very rapid, urgent rate. All the communications and transportation lines in the various directions, regions, and areas of the country were mobilized and assured the historic war-deciding battle. In actuality, the rear service sector assured that our armed forces could carry out a marvellously rapid general offensive consisting of three interconnected and successive campaigns which took place on three strategic areas of operation a thousand kilometers or so apart.

And never before had we mobilized rear service forces to serve the campaigns and battlefields with such large numbers and on such large scales. We mobilized both the rear service forces of the main-force troops and the local military rear service forces, the strategic, campaign, and combat forces, and both rear service forces pre-deployed on the battlefields and in the military regions and the mobile rear service forces coming up from the rear. We mobilized all truck transportation divisions, regiments, and units of the strategic areas, campaigns, and technical branches, and commo-liaison personnel, and utilized to the maximum the railroad, river, sea, air, and pipeline transportation facilities to transport troops and send materiel, equipment, and POL to the front. In addition to the rear service, technical, and transportation forces, the army also had a whole network of anti-aircraft, military engineer, communications, Assault Youth, and civilian corvee labor forces to fulfill the missions of transportation, supply, defending and assuring communications, etc. In all, there were hundreds of thousands of people and tens of thousands of facilities, including trucks, trains, airplanes, ships and boats, etc.

Utilizing large forces to assure a large quantity over a large area, at an extremely urgent rate and in a manner appropriate to the marvellously rapid, bold, surprise, and certain-victory method of attack of our armed forces, were outstanding characteristics and were at the same time extremely difficult, complicated, and new requirements of the army's rear service work in the army's rear service task in the 1975 strategic general offensive. Therefore, the rear area forces had to advance strongly with regard to will, determination, organizational ability, and operational methods.

Fully understanding the strategic intentions of the Party Central Committee and clearly realizing the historic opportunity, the army's rear service forces concentrated their will and devoted all their ability to fulfilling their responsibility of assuring the material and technical aspects and transporting troops to the front, in order to help the general offensive win complete victory and completely liberate our beloved South. With their own great efforts, and with the cooperation and positive assistance of the state organs and the local people as well as of the large numbers of cadres and men in all the units and the combat arms, the rear service forces of the army overcame all challenges and difficulties and fulfilled their missions. The imposing quantities of materiel, equipment, POL, ammunition, etc., for the strategic directions, the battlefields, and the fronts, as well as the campaigns and the battles, were assured fully and promptly. Tens of mobile corps and units were transported to the assembly points at the stipulated times and energetically entered the fighting. Never before had we succeeded so greatly and comprehensively in the rear service task. That success signified a new developmental step of the army's rear service task, and at the same time reflected the outstanding progress of our armed forces in the sphere of organizing rear services for the large-scale combined arms fighting in revolutionary war and people's war in our country.

1. The success of the army's rear service task during the strategic general offensive of the spring of 1975 was the result of preparations made during

many previous years, especially in 1973 and 1974. It was a success of the creation of a rear service posture for large-scale fighting, for strategic war-deciding blows to conclude the revolutionary war.

The rear service task may be regarded as an organic part of the campaign and strategic posture. There was no separate rear service posture, separated from the campaign and strategic posture. In creating a campaign and strategic posture, the assuring of rear services and material and technical preparations were indispensable. The rear service posture in people's war and liberation war in our country was created by the combination of many factors. Among those factors we must mention the road network, materiel and technical stockpiles at the various echelons, the quantity, quality, deployment configuration, and mobility capability of the rear area and technical forces on the battlefields, the capability to provide support with regard to materiel and equipment from the rear to the front, etc. A strong rear service posture, capable of meeting our armed forces' requirements regarding the assuring of materiel and technical aspects and transporting forces, in order to victoriously carry out strategic annihilating blows under all circumstances, was extremely necessary in the general offensive and uprising of the spring of 1975. In order to create that rear service posture, we had to make extremely strict and comprehensive rear service preparations, in accordance with the military thoughts, strategic determinations, and operational directions which the Party Central Committee delineated for the armed forces in the final phase of the revolutionary war.

Throughout the anti-U.S. resistance war for national salvation, our Party always paid much attention to aiding the great front line and to increasing the manpower and materiel of the battlefields. Because we fully grasped the viewpoint of revolutionary violence, in view of the U.S.-Thieu acts to sabotage the Paris Agreement and continue the neocolonial war of aggression in 1973-1974, we sought all conditions and circumstances to strengthen our economic and technical strength, prepare the battlefield, and make material, technical, communications-transportation, and other preparations at the front and in the rear, at all echelons and on all battlefields, in order to be prepared to assure the final war-deciding battle.

By the time of the general offensive we had a whole integrated road network extending from the rear area to the most distant battlefields and which consisted of many north-south and east-west arteries constituting the strategic, campaign, and combat routes. The strategic Ho Chi Minh route crossed the Truong Son chain and connected the two parts of the country not only by means of a route to the west but also by means of a route to the east. The important matter is that that road network was strengthened with regard to quality, thus assuring that the transportation trucks and the various types of vehicles of the specialized arms could increase their speed and operate many days during a week or month, during both the rainy season and the dry season. Later, because it was expanded along with the victorious momentum of the general offensive and linked with the road network in the newly liberated areas, that road network became even more complete. In addition to the road network there was a whole network of POL pipelines

thousands of kilometers long which ran parallel to the north-south strategic routes and branched off into the rear areas of the battlefields. We may regard the road network that was prepared in advance as a manifestation of the liveliness of the determination, confidence, strength, and talent of our Party, our people, and our army in preparing for the all-victorious general offensive.

Also before the general offensive we were able to build tens of thousands of square meters of warehouses and shelters, brought to the front tens of thousands of tons of materiel, equipment, and POL, created large stockpiles on the rear service routes and in the important strategic areas of operation, and made preparations so that the battlefields could fight large-scale battles over a long period of time. Furthermore, we mobilized and organized the people in the various areas and on the various battlefields so that they could participate in assuring the army's rear services.

In addition to the tens of thousands of rear service cadres and personnel who had to be assigned to strengthen the battlefields, we paid attention to preparing the mechanized transportation forces, in order to mechanize to the highest possible degree the transportation of foodstuffs, weapons, ammunition, and troops, the transporting of wounded soldiers, etc. Truck transportation units were created, consolidated, and developed into strong transportation regiments and divisions, and fulfilled their missions and training in accordance with the requirements of large-scale transportation. Mobile commo-liaison units were formed and served effectively. With regard to assuring technical facilities and military medical facilities, with a force of tens of thousands of technical cadres and personnel we formed networks consisting of tens of medium and small repair stations and tens of field hospitals and medical treatment units, etc.

Here we must still speak of preparing a rear service guidance and command echelon. Assimilating the experiences of many previous years, and in order to be prepared to meet the requirements of the coming missions, we simultaneously paid attention to increasing the combativeness of the rear service appara of the battlefields and to assigning cadres to those appara, while forming, adjusting, and stabilizing rear service guidance and command appara, doing a good job of resolving the command relationships, and cooperating in order to assure the material and technical aspects from the strategic echelon on down to the campaign and combat echelons, etc.

By means of the preparatory work we fully utilized all conditions to develop the full effect of the road network, deploy the rear service and transportation forces, and develop the warehouse, ordnance station, military medicine, technical, and other networks, so that they could be appropriate to the common strategic intention and the characteristics of each battlefield. That was a system of rear service deployment which had a solid posture and could move forward when the situation so required. That system of deployment created balance among the various aspects and integrated and mutual assistance between the upper echelon and the lower echelon, between one echelon and another, and between one battlefield and another. Therefore, we were able to create a

strong, active posture in the rear service task -- an element of decisive importance with regard to assuring rear services in the strategic general offensive. That posture of strength and initiative was not only formed from advanced preparation but was also continually consolidated by means of supplementary preparatory steps in the course of the campaigns and battles.

Even in the key, opening battle of Buon Me Thuot and in the Central Highlands campaign, our army's rear service sector clearly expressed its great effectiveness. It brought in foodstuffs, weapons, and ammunition in advance in order to prepare stockpiles, promptly supplemented materiel and equipment, and transported troops in correct accordance with the requirements. When the strategic offensive in the Central Highlands developed rapidly into a strategic general offensive throughout the South, the requirements of assuring rear services and the technical aspects, as well as of the transporting of troops, multiplied, and time became extremely urgent. But within only one week we were able to assure the basic material-technical requirements of the Hue-Danang campaign; and especially, after only 20 days we were able to transport the mobile groups, transport foodstuffs and ammunition, and move the rear service and technical forces to the Saigon-Gia Dinh front in order to launch the historic Ho Chi Minh campaign. The lively realities of the general offensive affirmed the effectiveness and importance of the rear service preparations and the creation of the posture of strength and initiative needed by the rear service sector to assure large-scale, combined combat arms fighting and the strategic annihilating blows which victoriously concluded the revolutionary war.

2. The success of the army's rear service task during the strategic general offensive of the spring of 1975 was the result of the rational use of the rear service formulas. We utilized mechanized rear service facilities (especially mechanized transportation) to a high degree to transport troops, materiel, and equipment from the rear to the front and from the higher echelon to the lower echelon, and made that the principal formula, while endeavoring to fully utilize and combine many different forces and formulas to effectively exploit all rear service capabilities for the fight.

On the front of assuring rear services, the utilization of one formula or another is always a matter which directly and greatly influences the results of developing the effect of the rear service posture that has been created and developing all capabilities necessary to assure that the armed forces win victory in all circumstances of combat and war.

If during the strategic general offensive the army's rear service sector underwent outstanding development, it was first of all development in the use of mechanized forces. The utilization to a high degree of mechanized transportation forces, especially truck transportation forces, in order to transport troops and take materiel and equipment of the front truly became the principal formula for assuring rear services.

The requirement regarding the use of mechanized forces in the rear service task and transportation was a matter posed for revolutionary war and people's

war in our country in the course of the anti-U.S. resistance war for national salvation. By the time of the general offensive that requirement had become more pressing than ever. The mechanized forces and facilities mobilized for the military transportation mission in our people's war included the army's transportation forces and the transportation forces of the state and the people. By the time of the general offensive those capabilities had been mobilized to a high degree and the conditions assuring the utilization of mechanized transportation forces on a large scale were prepared rather fully, especially the network of roads. Therefore, from the point of view of requirements, capabilities, and conditions the strategic general offensive was a special point in time when we required, and could best utilize, large-scale mechanized forces in the rear service and transportation sectors.

We mobilized tens of thousands of trucks. We also utilized hundreds of railroad cars and thousands of sea-going ships. In many instances, we used even aircraft. We had continually utilized POL pipelines for many years. We utilized truck transportation forces and the mechanized transportation forces not only in transporting foodstuffs, weapons, and ammunition, but also in transporting troops, moving the units, taking wounded soldiers to the higher echelon, taking wounded soldiers to the rear, etc. Nearly all of the supplying of materiel and equipment to the fronts, the combat directions, the tactical units, the divisions and regiments, etc., in the course of the general offensive was done by means of mechanized facilities. Nearly all of the strategic mobile groups were transported from the rear area to the battlefield or from one front to another by means of mechanized facilities. If in the past the transporting of wounded soldiers at the front was seldom done by boat and vehicle, in the general offensive, 80 percent of the wounded soldiers were transported by means of mechanized facilities. The large-scale use of truck transportation forces at the strategic echelon, on a medium and large scale at the tactical echelon under many circumstances, etc., not only reflected the degree of mechanization of rear services and transportation but also reflected the notable progress regarding the organization and command of the mechanized rear service and transportation forces. That is an indispensable part of the art of organizing and commanding large-scale combined arms combat.

With the actual effectiveness that has been attained, the utilization of the mechanized forces on a large scale in the rear service and transportation activities clearly reflected their decisive role in transporting the mechanized groups over long distances so that they could reach their destinations at the right time, and take foodstuffs and ammunition to the fronts and units fully and promptly, under fierce, complicated, and urgent circumstances. It contributed importantly to assuring the rapid mobility, storm-like offensive strength, and strong assault force of our troops throughout the course of the strategic general offensive. Clearly, raising the level of mechanization in the rear service and transportation sectors was very necessary, and was appropriate to the developmental laws of people's war in Vietnam under modern conditions.

However, the great effectiveness of the rear service front in the general offensive could only have been the effectiveness of the close, constant combination between the utilization of mechanized forces on a large scale to transport, supply, and supplement from the rear to the front and from the upper echelon to the lower echelon, with the organization of suitable, ready stockpiles at the various echelons and in the various areas, and the accurate, timely use of those great stockpiles in combat. At the same time, we had to positively develop the capability to assure on-the-spot rear services among the people, and immediately use the food, weapons and ammunition, equipment, etc. captured from the enemy in the battles and campaigns.

With large quantities of materiel and equipment stockpiled in advance in the strategic areas and on the battlefields, we enabled the transportation echelon to have ready sources of cargo, shorted the supply lines, and gain time for increasing the number of trips. Therefore, the effectiveness of transportation and the efficiency of assuring rear services increased. With large stockpiles we could not only assure the plans but could also meet the needs under unexpected circumstances, when the requirements for food and ammunition greatly increased. In our people's war, the on-the-spot forces are the fastest mobile forces. With the materiel stockpiles in the strategic areas and on the battlefields, and knowing how to mobilize the rear services forces and capabilities on the local people and how to take from the enemy to fight the enemy, we were entirely capable of assuring rear services positively, urgently, promptly, and effectively under the developing circumstances of combat and war.

Such stockpiling was very appropriate to the characteristics, nature, and battlefield posture of people's war and liberation war in our country. Therefore, only if we correctly evaluate the role and effect of that stockpiling can we correctly understand the effectiveness of the assuring of rear services during the campaigns and battles that occurred incessantly and urgently during the course of the general offensive.

The lively actualities of the strategic general offensive once again proved the capabilities of the people of the localities in assuring rear services for the three types of troops. In the Central Highlands campaign, the Hue-Danang campaign, and the historic Ho Chi Minh campaign the local people participated positively in supplying grain and ammunition, in transporting and caring for wounded soldiers, etc. The people in many places and many cities and municipalities mobilized hundreds of trucks and three-wheeled Lambrettas to assist in transporting troops, and used hundreds of junks, boats, cargo bicycles, and bicycles to transport rice, ammunition, etc. Therefore, even under the conditions of modern combat, the strength of the army's rear service task in people's war in our country always includes those capabilities.

If in people's war the foodstuffs, weapons and ammunition, and equipment captured from the enemy are an on-the-spot source of materiel supply for our armed forces, in the strategic general offensive that source of supply became very great. The various types of artillery, trucks, and tanks, along with

the modern communications facilities and even the POL, foodstuffs, etc., which the divisions and corps captured from the enemy and used in combat amounted to thousands of items and tens of thousands or hundreds of thousands of tons. Furthermore, we also took over all the military and economic material-technical bases left behind by the enemy. That task was very great. It surpassed the limits of the rear services task and became a common task for the state and of all armed forces. However, in the sphere of the army we had to look ahead and make plans, and had to make good preparations with regard to technical forces and facilities as well as with regard to management measures in the course of the campaigns, in order to promptly take over and use the various types of the enemy's weapons and equipment in combat, and do a good job of maintaining and storing that equipment in order to use it over a long period of time. By doing so we did a good job of developing the on-the-spot sources of supply and truly increased the source of material-equipment supplies for the troops for the urgent development development of the fighting and the achievement of the motto of becoming stronger as we fight.

3. The success of the army's rear service task in the general offensive of the spring of 1975 was also the success of the active, resolute and creative guidance and command of the rear services forces and the entire rear services and transportation front, and the greatest development of the effectiveness of rear services under all circumstances.

In revolutionary war, the guidance and command of the various echelons -- especially the strategic echelon -- is always an extremely important subjective element for rallying the forces and capabilities and developing to the highest degree the strengths of the forces and capabilities in victoriously achieving the pre-determined goals.

Deeply embued with the strategic decision and the action guidance thought of "marvellously rapid speed, boldness, surprise, and certain victory," of the Political Bureau, guidance and command on the rear services front always closely followed the developments of the fighting, promptly and accurately dealt with the various circumstances, and effectively mobilized and guided all rear services, technical, and transportation forces and capabilities and enabled the rear services activities to always be in harmony with the intensity and speed of the strategic general offensive.

Guidance and command on the rear services front gained the initiative by means of careful preparations and the creation of a solid rear services posture before the launching of the key, opening battle, by employing and combining the various work formulas, doing a good job of drafting and fulfilling plans, etc. We decided upon three types of plans to assure rear services: a plan for continual material-technical aid for the battlefields; a basic plan for assuring rear services in accordance with the strategic design; and a contingency plan for promptly responding to the situation when major opportunities appeared. Therefore, even when the general offensive developed favorably and rapidly the rear services sector was not passive.

The strategic general offensive itself was a process of continual and strong attacks throughout a period of 55 days and nights by our armed forces by means of interspersed and successive campaigns, with large-scale combined arms battles in different areas of operation, in close combination with the mass uprisings in the localities. Some units had to move rapidly over long distances while also preparing to promptly enter battle. Some units had to urgently change direction in order to rapidly create overwhelming forces in a new direction. And there were regiments, divisions, and corps which had to break through the enemy's outer defense perimeters in order to advance southward to participate in the historic Ho Chi Minh campaign. Our troops' fighting methods in the campaigns, with their new development, always manifested the method of attack of marvellously rapid speed, boldness, surprise, and certain victory. Therefore, promptly making new decisions to deploy the rear service, technical, and transportation forces, adjust and deploy the various echelons, guide the supplying of rice, ammunition, and POL, and transport wounded soldiers, so that those activities meshed with the requirements of the campaigns, battles, columns, and units under the circumstances of the urgent, complicated, and fierce development of the general offensive, were very necessary. Such decisions had to be made rapidly and accurately, and had to be carried out immediately. They could only be the result of active, resolute, bold and flexible guidance and command, based on a full understanding of the strategic determination and the campaign and combat intentions, on closely following the developments on the battlefields, and on correct evaluations of our developmental tendency and the enemy's capability to react.

The effectiveness of the active, resolute, and creative guidance and command resulted from the fact that in the course of the development of the general offensive we were able to maintain unified centralization and close cooperation between the rear services and transportation echelons at the front and those in the rear, and thereby both maintained balance among the ordnance, military medicine, technical, POL, and other aspects, in accordance with the troops' rate of attack, and strongly promoted the central concern of transporting the mobile groups and transporting foodstuffs and ammunition to the front with marvellous speed. Whether technical, POL, rear services, or transportation forces, and whether forces at the strategic, campaign, or combat echelon, or whether they were pre-deployed on the battlefield or had just moved up from the rear, all of them operated in accordance with unified policies and plans, from the highest commanders and command organs of the rear services front in the general offensive down to the units and detachments. All coordinated closely with one another in each element, at each echelon, and in each force, and among the elements, echelons, and forces, along the lines of "common action is everything," in order to assure the complete victory of the general offensive. The rear area forces always endeavored to advance to the fore and create conditions for the front to fulfill its missions well. Each force, echelon, and element positively and with initiative did a good job of fulfilling its responsibilities and missions, and was prepared to give all-out assistance to the other echelons and elements. The subjective factors for transforming the rear service posture and the rear service formulas into actual force in the course of the general offensive were such unified actions and close cooperation.

In the developmental process of the general offensive very great, complicated, and urgent requirements were posed, especially the requirements regarding the organization of military transportation in order to move mobile forces, with regard to transporting additional fuel for the mechanized facilities, with regard to assuring artillery shells for the key battles, etc.

The rear services commanders and organs at the various levels played an extremely important role in creating the great effectiveness on the rear services and technical front in the strategic general offensive. The people guiding and commanding rear services and the rear services organs at the various echelons -- especially at the strategic echelon -- not only had to be capable of serving as effective staffs with regard to the rear services, technical, and transportation aspects for the combined arms commanders and the strategic commanders, but also had to be capable of carrying out with high effectiveness the guidance and command of all the rear service, technical, and transportation forces, and of mobilizing and utilizing all rear services forces and capabilities in assuring the fighting. Under difficult, complicated, and urgent circumstances, it was even more necessary that the people guiding and commanding rear services and rear service organs always master their responsibilities and have a determined, resolute, practical, meticulous, bold, and accurate work style. They had to manifest a high degree of subjective vigor in order to overcome the disadvantageous objective conditions, contribute positively to transforming the situation, and enabling the entire vast, complicated apparatus for assuring the material-technical aspects to continually operate in a manner in accord with the continually developing requirements of the strategic general offensive.

The strategic general offensive of the spring of 1975 brought about extremely rich and lively experiences regarding the assuring of the material-technical aspects for the armed forces in large-scale, combined arms fighting. The above are only some of the initial matters drawn from those experiences. Those matters have provided the rear services task and the army's rear services sector useful contents with regard to the development of forces, the stockpiling of materiel and equipment in accordance with the strategic requirements, combat readiness with regard to the rear services, technical, and transportation aspects, and the assuring of the rear services, technical, and transportation aspects during a people's war to defend the Fatherland under modern conditions in our country. It is certain that in military science research and in recapitulating the war in the future we will have conditions for entering deeply into the lessons and experiences of the general offensive and will, by that means, contribute even more to developing theory regarding the assuring of rear services, and contribute to advancing the army's rear services sector rapidly and strongly to a regular, modern status.

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